

Clio's Scroll



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Clio's Scroll, the Berkeley Undergraduate History Journal, is published twice yearly by students of the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley. The journal aims to provide undergraduates with the opportunity to publish historical works and to train staff members in the editorial process of an academic journal.

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Note from the Editors

There is a working relationship between change and identity. Identity is reevaluated to make sense of changing situations. A modified identity can cause a change of action. In recent months, this working relationship has played out in various contexts in the global and domestic landscapes, which are forcing states, institutions, and people to reassess their roles in these overlapping processes.

In the United States, for example, the upcoming elections have witnessed a traditional electorate divided not just by two major parties, but more by support for individuals. The parties are thus struggling to hold themselves together.¹ In Europe, conversations continue on what it means to be a European state. The recent 'Brexit' referendum in the United Kingdom only complicates the situation more.² Conflicts are also adding to this. The failed coup in Turkey brings into concern the role of NATO in civil conflict and further causes concern on the long debate over Turkey's inclusion in the European Union.³ The millions of displaced migrants and refugees coming largely from the Middle East are also forcing Europe to wonder how this will affect the region.⁴ Furthermore, this refugee situation has led to a change in the state-centric traditions of the Olympic Games, like the Parade of Nations, with the inclusion of the Refugee Olympic Team.⁵ In China, a very recent ad campaign by the Chinese Communist Party to promote national pride is also attempting to answer the question "who am I?" through individual narratives. This, of course,

¹ See, for example, Conor Friedersdorf, "Among the Pure at 'Bernie or Bust,'" *Atlantic*, July 27, 2016; Conor Friedersdorf, "Donald Trump Is No Conservative," *Atlantic*, July 13, 2016; Robert Kagan, "This is How Fascism Comes to America," *Washington Post*, May 18, 2016.

² Aurelien Breeden, "'Brexit' Bats Aside Younger Generation's European Identity," *New York Times*, July 2, 2016.

³ See Adam Taylor, "Turkey's Increasingly Complicated Relationship with NATO," *Washington Post*, July 19, 2016; James Stavridis, "Turkey and NATO: What Comes Next Is Messy," *Foreign Policy* (blog), July 18, 2016.

⁴ See "Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts," *BBC News*, March 4, 2016.

⁵ "Refugee Olympic Team to Shine Spotlight on Worldwide Refugee Crisis," International Olympic Committee press release, July 3, 2016, <https://www.olympic.org/news/refugee-olympic-team-to-shine-spotlight-on-worldwide-refugee-crisis>.

comes after the symbolic decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague rejecting China's historic claim to sovereignty in the South China Sea, challenging China's identity in the global order.⁶

Determining an identity among constant change—personally, locally, nationally, and internationally—is a complicated question, and one that is central to this issue of *Clio's Scroll*. This spring 2016 issue brings together three rising scholars with various historical interests and from the history departments of Berkeley, the University of Chicago, and Yale University. Their well-written articles explore the concept of identity throughout three distinct moments in history. The articles here are related to international, civic, and ethnic identity.

At first glance, the contributions in this issue may seem odd to relate with one another. Collectively, however, a common theme emerges: the impact of unjust pasts on identity. For instance, in Japan in 1905, violent protests ensued after the Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese War. Japanese American youth, by contrast, utilized community events to ultimately reject a larger attempt at assimilating Japanese Americans in the postwar era in Chicago, Illinois. Coloured high school students in post-apartheid South Africa managed both collective and individual identities while learning to understand a past of prescribed identity.

To effectively argue their points, each of the authors in this issue has examined a variety of sources including archival material, interviews with subjects of their study, and the relevant literature. The issue opens with Dylan Siegel's discussion of the Japanese *minkan's* contrasting view over the international position of Japan than the Meiji era aristocracy's. This article provides a framework for understanding how international relations produce civil strife. The recent Berkeley graduate's article further explores the role of generational gaps in state development. Yumika Takeshita of the University of Chicago then discusses the experience of postwar Japanese Americans in Chicago. Drawing on interviews with Japanese Americans who grew up in Chicago at the time, she argues that they developed a civic identity while rejecting various integration efforts by local officials and Japanese American organizations. Takeshita

⁶ On *The Republic of the Philippines v. the Republic of China* at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, see Jane Perlez, "Tribunal Rejects Beijing's Claims in South China Sea," *New York Times*, July 12, 2016. On the "heart-tugging" television ad, see Chris Buckley, "Chinese Communist Party's New TV Ad Asks, 'Who Am I?'" *New York Times*, July 28, 2016.

suggests a different view than Ellen Wu's argument that ethnically exclusive activities were organized to fully integrate to American society. In the final article, recent Yale University graduate Andrew Stein presents his findings from an extensive on-site study of The Settlers High School in Cape Town, South Africa. Drawing on archival research of the institution and twenty interviews with former students and staff, his case study explores self-identity in a transitioning society long ravaged by state-imposed identities.

Ultimately, all subjects in these essays capture moments in history where people reassessed their identity in the wake of unjust pasts, which included navigating racial discrimination in international diplomacy, wartime ethnic internment, and state-enforced racial segregation. As we continue to deal with making sense of contemporary issues and attempting to (re)shape identities, history should always shed light on the truth.

Similarly, *Clio's Scroll* is going through a transformative moment in discovering and developing an identity as the undergraduate journal of history at Berkeley. We promised in the previous issue that the journal would be taken "in a new direction...with major renovations in style, editorial procedures, and greater attention to detail."⁷ Since then, we succeeded in various ways. After developing a new strategy to present the design and professionalism of our journal to other universities during our call for papers, we were honored to have effectively doubled the amount of submissions we normally receive, while seeing an overall improvement in the quality of papers. We received dozens of submissions coming from fourteen universities.

Of course, with this success, we were met with other challenges. We were not prepared to receive that many submissions. Our success came through at a moment when most of our editorial board was completing a thesis and their undergraduate career. This *spring* issue is presented late in the year in August due to unanticipated success. Nonetheless, we sincerely apologize to our readers and contributors.

⁷ Scott Davis and Kevin D. Reyes, "Note from the Editors," *Clio's Scroll* 17, no. 1 (Fall 2015): 1.

The goal of this journal is, as our mission statement reads, “to provide undergraduates with the opportunity to publish historical works and to train staff members in the editorial process of an academic journal.” Aiming to take this seriously as an undergraduate journal is a significant challenge. To deal with this challenge, we are working really strongly to deliver a highly professional undergraduate journal for historical research. As a result, we are producing in-depth submission and editorial guidelines, more organizational infrastructure in order to maintain this trajectory and meet grueling deadlines, as well as an advisory board of former editors and affiliates.

The incoming editor-in-chief and managing editor are Lucy Song and Bitia Mousavi, respectively. It is our pleasure to hand the journal over to them. As always, we thank our institutional and financial supporters. First, we thank the Townsend Center for the Humanities and the Associated Students at the University of California (ASUC) for funding us as a student group over the years. We are extremely grateful for continued support and encouragement from the Department of History at Berkeley. We extend our gratitude to Leah Flanagan for her amazing guidance. Finally, we thank our editors, congratulate those who graduated this year, and thank the contributors in this issue for their patience and engagement.

Sincerely,
The Editors

Contributors

DYLAN Z. SIEGEL graduated with honors from the UC Berkeley Department of History. His studies focused primarily on modern Japanese history, but also expanded into comparative and postwar history topics. Dylan has recently begun work as a grant writer at the Orange County-based nonprofit Hope Builders. He would like to extend his gratitude to Professors Alexander C. Cook and Mary Elizabeth Berry for their persistent guidance and support during the research and writing process. He would also like to thank the UC Berkeley Department of History for providing travel funds to research at UCLA.

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The Search for Parity

*The Minkan's Bitter Reaction to Japan's International Position,
1895-1905*

Dylan Z. Siegel
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臥薪嘗胆

literally, to lie on wood and lick gall;

in other words, to persevere for the sake of vengeance

—Popular phrase in newspapers after the Sino-Japanese War.¹

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Japan filled the position of middle sibling in the world order. Like a middle sibling, Japan occupied a somewhat unfortunate place in this hierarchy of international relations. Always pining for its elders' approval, Japan continually found ways to push around its younger siblings.² After sustaining smarting insults for years, the Japan that looked up to its Western counterparts eventually began carving its own path initiated by an agitated faction of the populace.

Japan did not simply fall into an intermediary international position, but rather secured it during a forty-year period of exhaustive change in domestic and foreign policy. The domestic changes involved vast reorientations in political structure, education, defense, and even self-

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¹ This phrase entered the newspaper vernacular around the time of the Triple Intervention. It is a reference to a Chinese proverb and did not necessarily originate with any one newspaper. A brief definition can be found in James L. Huffman, *Creating a Public: People and Press in Meiji Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 219–20.

² This is a reference to Japan, Korea, and China's shared lineage. While both Japan and Western countries portrayed the relationship between these three countries as familial in nature, around the turn of the century, Japan successfully distinguished itself from Korea and China.

imposed cultural changes. These domestic transformations, along with new international policies, like interventions in Korea, allowed Japan to ascend to a position above its regional siblings Japan further impressed Western countries by defeating China and Russia in war. It seemed that Japan's international position was trending upward and that it might achieve parity with its Western counterparts. Yet victorious wars, along with beneficial treaties, proved insufficient for the international position that some Japanese desired. No matter the circumstances, the so-called "comity of nations"—Western European nations and the U.S.—humiliated Japan with a consistent feeling of unworthiness. Many Japanese citizens foresaw a new path to equity after the 1895 Triple Intervention cohort forcibly suggested Japan change its peace treaty terms with China.

The decade between 1895 and 1905 of the Meiji era generated new changes in Japanese society that rivaled the quarter century of transformation begun by the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The Meiji Restoration began by restoring the Meiji emperor to a powerful monarch after a regional warlord system proliferated for centuries. Along with this and other political changes, Japan's contact with powerful and threatening Western countries forced it to implement further Western-inspired societal changes that focused on strengthening the military, encouraging commercial enterprise, and even adjusting certain cultural practices. The restoration and its massive reorientations provided many of the seeds of change for the decade from 1895 to 1905. Some of the most important changes in this decade began with a group of the populace, known as the *minkan*, who wielded power outside of the government and especially in the press. Even though the *minkan* and the rest of Japanese society experienced the Meiji Restoration's destabilizing modernization, or Westernization, efforts and a consistent amount and quality of international inequality up until 1895, a sizable portion of this group believed that their international position was no longer commensurate with their nation's achievements. Foreign interventions, for example, diminished the benefits of Japan's victorious wars. The existence of a generational gap between the young *minkan* and the elder oligarchy that governed and guided Japan since the Meiji restoration allowed *minkan* attitudes to shift. Most *minkan* did not live through the consistent threat of territorial incursion from imperialist powers that the elder oligarchy had grappled with and pursued modernization efforts in response to. Thus,

shaped by a different upbringing, the *minkan* simultaneously criticized the elder generation's slow-burning pragmatism and turned towards a new political ideology of militaristic and vociferous nationalism. A study of the vernacular press through the lens of two English-language papers, the *Japan Weekly Mail* and *Japan Times*, reveals both the criticisms directed at the elder generation and the *minkan*'s political ideology, which they articulated in reaction to the Triple Intervention in 1895, the promulgation of the revision of the Unequal Treaties in 1899, and the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. The *minkan* sought immediate vindication for insults to Japan, whereas the oligarchs desired a gradual change in Japan's international position.

I. METHODOLOGY, PRINCIPAL EVENTS, AND ACTORS

This article relies upon two English-language papers published in Japan—the *Japan Weekly Mail* and *Japan Times*—to deduce these reactions. British nationals published the *Japan Mail* in weekly and daily versions, making it a proximal source of foreign opinion for the Japanese government. Japanese citizens established the *Japan Times* in 1897 to encourage positive relations between foreign nationals and Japanese citizens.³ As a Japanese publication, it supplemented commentary found in the vernacular press. However, the most important aspects of the English-language newspapers proved to be their summarizations and reproductions of vernacular press articles. Both papers maintained a section devoted to the vernacular press and the most exemplary articles of the day. The maturing vernacular press dedicated a significant amount of coverage to events related to Japan's changing international position and acted as a regular commentator on the issue. The number of English-language articles that commented on, reported on, or related to the vernacular press increased during times when the Japanese reaction to their international position was the most virulent. Accordingly, during the Triple Intervention of 1895, the *Japan Weekly Mail* and *Japan Times* extended space given to vernacular press reactions. Nonetheless, these two papers' limitations as sources include circulation proportionate to a small foreign population, Japanese legal restrictions beginning in 1899, and an inherent Western

³ "Raison d'être," *Japan Times*, March 22, 1897.

bias.⁴ These two publications function as a lens to peer at the incendiary reactions of the *minkan* in the vernacular press. Reactions ranged from disillusion with the pragmatic oligarchy to furious nationalism.

Three events are key to understanding Japanese reactions regarding their subordinate international position: the Triple Intervention of the Sino-Japanese War in April 1895, the promulgation of the revision of the Unequal Treaties in July 1899, and the Treaty of Portsmouth of the Russo-Japanese War in September 1905. The Triple Intervention—led by Russia, France, and Germany—amended the bilateral peace terms set by China and Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese War. Diplomats from the intervening countries strongly advised Japanese diplomats to accept changes to the treaty because of alleged regional interests. Japan's forced retroactive cession of the Liaotung peninsula to China comprised the most important and upsetting revision for the Japanese. The new treaty also stipulated that China pay an increased indemnity. Clearly, Russia had interests in the region. However, mostly as a result of contemporary balance of power politics, France and, most peculiarly, Germany, moved to back the forceful suggestion. As will become clear, the Triple Intervention's effects on the Japanese populace and society influenced decisions and attitudes during the ten-year period from 1895 to 1905 and reverberated far beyond.

The promulgation of the revision of the Unequal Treaties took place on July 17 and August 4, 1899. The gap in dates is of little more consequence than the obstinacy of two straggler countries insisting on August 4. Japanese people considered July 17 the date that revision finally took place. Japan and Western countries first enacted the Unequal Treaties between 1854 and 1869.⁵ The treaties imposed several unfavorable terms upon Japan that will be explored in detail below. The revision of the treaties held the highest importance to the Japanese state and citizens alike because it acted as a constant reminder of their subjugated international position. On the date of revision and subsequent weeks, Japanese people rejoiced and praised their country's progress. The revision of the treaties signified the culmination of Japanese efforts to assert a higher national position.

⁴ Peter O'Connor, *The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918-45* (Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental, 2010), 6-7.

⁵ Louis G. Perez, *Japan Comes of Age: Mutsu Munemitsu and the Revision of the Unequal Treaties* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1999), 188.

The Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. As the name of the treaty suggests, Japan and Russia did not negotiate on the Eurasian continent, but in Portsmouth, New Jersey. President Theodore Roosevelt offered to mediate the negotiations between Japan and Russia as a neutral party. Negotiations took place during August and a signed treaty emerged in early September. Japan rose in international position after defeating a “great power” in an illustrious victory. However, Japanese citizens greeted the peace treaty with resounding and violent disapproval. The treaty mandated that Japan and Russia split the Japanese-occupied Sakhalin islands, and that Russia would not be held responsible for an indemnity to Japan. Many had assumed that Japan’s financial strain during this war would be assuaged by an indemnity. Both points in this treaty aroused vile disappointment. This event and the ensuing reactions demonstrate Japan’s dissatisfaction with the international position that treaties or agreements implied. While looking at this decade’s reactions to international events, Portsmouth feels very much like a coherent ending. It carried the greatest furor over an international insult that provoked dark memories of the Triple Intervention and violent uprising at Hibiya Park.⁶

These three events and, more broadly, this decade, is important due to the density and depth of the events, but also for being a culmination in early Meiji policy. At a topical level, a decade in which one country went to war with and defeated two countries, signed and promulgated two immensely beneficial treaties (Unequal Treaties and Anglo-Japanese alliance), and intervened in two countries’ domestic affairs (Korean sovereignty and China’s Boxer Rebellion), would be worthy of study. Each of the above events produced a deep legacy or represented the culmination of an early Meiji desire. The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, their treaties, and the Japanese response left lasting impressions among Japanese, Chinese, Russians, and other foreign nationals. The promulgation of treaty revision in 1899 vindicated the smarting and continual insults of the first Unequal Treaty of 1858. As historian Carol Gluck wrote, “[i]t was almost as if the early Meiji scenario for gaining parity with the West were being played out in a late Meiji

⁶ Arlo Ayres Brown, “The Great Tokyo Riot: The History and Historiography of the Hibiya Incendiary Riot of 1905” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1986).

world, so that treaty revision, the victories over China and Russia, and the alliance with Britain seemed both the successful conclusion to a past quest as well as a departure in imperial power for the future.”⁷ Thus, this decade was teleological in some ways.

Yet it also delivered new ideas representing a shift in political ideology in Japan. This decade marked the beginning of what historian Kenneth Pyle refers to as “Japan’s historical predicament” of being “both modern and Japanese.”⁸ To refocus on the aspects of Japanese society that birthed new and disparate theories of civilization and politics, it is “perhaps best understood as a reaction to the dislocations and uncertainties created by a generation of breathtaking change.”⁹ Historian Marius Jansen writes that this decade “marks the center of [the] process” of Imperial Japan’s creation.¹⁰ Imperial Japan, in the sense that it acquired foreign colonies and curated a policy of intervention, ostensibly began with the Sino-Japanese war. This decade, then, represents the catharsis and realization of Japanese international aspirations. It is the birth of an empire.

The political elite responsible for Japan’s exhaustive changes and lamentable international position were made up of roughly three groups. During this decade, the political elite confronted rigid opposition over their international policy from many *minkan*. The first group of elite who created early Meiji ideology and its political structures were members of the Meiji Six Society (*Meirokeisha*). The second group emerged from the modernizing government comprised mostly from the former domains of Satsuma and Choshu (often referred to as the *hanbatsu*). Those who held informal consulting power known as the elder statesmen (*genrō*) made up the third group. These groups are not necessarily distinct or all-inclusive, but are a representative selection of the ruling class. Fukuzawa Yukichi, the creator and chief advocate of “civilization and enlightenment” (to be explained fully below) existed largely outside of these three groups, but also penned an article in the Meiji Six Society’s magazine publication

⁷ Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 18.

⁸ Kenneth B. Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1895* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 188–92.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁰ Marius B. Jansen, “Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization,” in *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 76–77.

(*Meiroke zasshi*).¹¹ And, while former samurai from Satsuma and Choshu occupied the majority of government posts, informal and formal, by no means were they all involved in the private coalition of thought that was the Meiji Six Society. The elder statesmen made up the most exclusive and powerful group inside and outside the government. Historian Shumpei Okamoto, in agreement with fellow historian Roger Hackett, writes that the coagulation of the elder statesmen as a recognizable group took place at the time of the promulgation of the constitution in 1890.¹² The elder statesmen's power was informally institutionalized before this period of study. Itō Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Matsukata Masayoshi, Inoue Kaoru, and Ōyama Iwao made up the elder statesmen.¹³ Each of these men participated in overthrowing the Tokugawa shogun and afterwards quickly assumed key posts in the new government. Okamoto details the preeminence of both the Satsuma-Choshu clique in government positions and the less formal elder statesmen as nearly always holding an important position of power, even at the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.¹⁴ This amalgamated "oligarchy-elder statesmen" group and their policies received increasing doubt during the 1890s and especially after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. At this point, new political actors, usually not involved in the government, began to assert influence and power. They are the primary objects of this study.

These actors, known as the *minkan*, translated as "among the people," existed mostly outside the government. *Minkan* does not refer to common people but to the "journalists, intellectuals, and public figures who produced a disproportionate amount of the 'public opinion' (*yoron*) of the period."¹⁵ This group did not include government officials and especially not those associated with the elder statesmen or Satsuma-Choshu clique. Many new and adventurous writers and editors of the vernacular press belonged to this cohort. As Carol Gluck describes, "[t]hey decried

¹¹ *Meiroke Zasshi: Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment*, trans. William Reynolds Braisted with assistance from Adachi Yasushi and Kikuchi Yūji (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 385.

¹² Shumpei Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 14.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 37–38.

¹⁵ Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 9–10.

materialism, commended patriotism, questioned socialism, and urged Japan on to greater prestige as a world power.”¹⁶ This group of people did not exist in the 1870s or early 1880s as a coherent entity, but coagulated and began exerting power and influence into the 1890s. Despite the range of this group’s views on the political spectrum, their opinions and continued opposition presented challenges to those political elite who still held the reigns of power. The vociferous anger over Japan’s stagnant international position seems to have been born inside their newspapers, private societies, and minds.

II. IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURES OF MEIJI JAPAN (1868-1912)

A theme of this project and the decade in question is the recurrence of international events triggering strong domestic reactions. Prior to effectively revising its international treaties in 1899, Japan required a domestic modernization effort. Thus, domestic and international goals became entangled. Nonetheless, the fact that modernization, or Westernization, was inseparably tied to Japan in this international context requires the unpacking of several concepts. The structures that the oligarchy established throughout the early Meiji period, like ideology or laws, influenced the actors of this decade in significant ways. The early iterations of modernization ideology influenced how the oligarchy pursued Japan’s foreign policy. *Minkan* questioned newspaper and freedom of expression laws enacted by the oligarchic government. The comparatively different upbringings of both *minkan* and oligarchy deeply influenced how they understood and reacted to Japan’s subordinate international position. The *minkan* and oligarchy did not act in a vacuum, but professed and defended their positions in an environment rich in competing historical influences.

The oligarchic political elite generated the first iterations of Meiji modernization ideology that can be roughly summarized by two popular phrases: “civilization and enlightenment” (*bunmei kaika*) and “rich country, strong army” (*fukoku kyōhei*). The slogan and idea of “civilization and enlightenment” was especially popular among members of the Meiji Six Society, comprised of many who had traveled to the West to absorb

¹⁶ Ibid., 10.

aspects of Western society they believed worth implementing in Japan.¹⁷ Members of the Meiji Six Society used sufficiently vague phrases like “civilization and enlightenment” to co-opt disparate policies of government in the name of progress. However, some Meiji Six Society members disapproved of the fluidity with which the government used the phrase’s vagueness to co-opt policy.¹⁸ On the other hand, “rich country, strong army” was more concrete and could represent changes like a growing number of merchant vessels, business enterprise, and changes in military structure and technology. Historian Donald Shively argues that “rich country, strong army” was the more important of these phrases for modernization since it contained the possibility of repelling foreign incursion by utilizing a strong military.¹⁹ The threat of foreign intervention represented a vital concern to those implementing the massive structural changes of Meiji. There was a consensus in the first thirty years of Meiji that leaders would undertake modernization to maintain independence and to dissolve the inequality that Japan faced.²⁰

The political philosophy referred to as “gradualism” (*zenshinshugi*) describes the pace of social and political change most oligarchs felt best fit Japanese domestic policy.²¹ Gradualism tended towards a pragmatic foreign policy that preferred slow change and found favor with the incumbent oligarchy. Fukuchi Gen’ichirō, one of Japan’s first professional newsmen, supported this incumbent-friendly policy. In fact, in early Meiji, the topic of creating a national assembly created a rift among intellectuals and leaders, based upon their support for government policies.²² Itō Hirobumi, the prolific statesman and elder advisor of Meiji, also subscribed to this view. He felt that in the process of modernization, people’s intellect would grow first, and a representative government

¹⁷ Donald H. Shively, “Nishimura Shigeki: A Confucian View of Modernization,” in *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization*, 197.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 199.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 193–94.

²⁰ Jansen, “Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization,” 65; Roger F. Hackett, “The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo,” in *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization*, 244–45.

²¹ James L. Huffman, *Politics of the Meiji Press: The Life of Fukuchi Gen’ichirō* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawai’i, 1980), 4.

²² *Ibid.*, 82.

would follow afterwards.²³ In other words, gradualists thought that unleashing the power of the vote onto the Japanese populace was an unwise decision. But Itō was not averse to the gradual inculcation of modern values in the population. This type of mindset likely pervaded political thought among the oligarchy and especially the elder statesmen. This style of slow pragmatism regarding a national assembly bled into ideas about foreign policy. However, the *minkan* grew to detest the slow-minded international policies that the Meiji oligarchs favored.

The oligarchy pursued modernization efforts largely to relinquish the most insulting and damaging terms of the Unequal Treaties. These treaty terms were the greatest recurring evidence of Japan's poor international position. Four provisions especially aggravated Japanese self-esteem. Consular jurisdiction, often broadly referred to as extraterritoriality, gave jurisdiction over expatriate criminal cases inside Japanese borders to a foreign consulate. The courts also conducted proceedings in the foreign country's language of choice whether the plaintiff was Japanese or not. The most favored nation status clause "stipulated that any and all concessions granted by the Japanese to any nation were automatically granted to all treaty powers." This effectively allowed the terms most damaging to Japan to be renewed even if a single country revised the original. Therefore, a truly liberating revision required the approval of all nations involved. Unfavorable tariffs required any import products into Japan to accrue an "artificially low 5%" tariff rate. Lastly, for the first time, several ports opened to international trade and allowed foreign residence inside them. These terms reminded Japanese of their poor economic and political position among the strongest Western powers. Soon after the Meiji restoration, the Japanese government and, to an extent, the public became increasingly concerned with the Unequal Treaties and what they told of Japan's international position.²⁴

Along with the resonance of modernization theories and the ignominious Unequal Treaties, the oligarchy restricted freedom of assembly and speech in ways that affected how Meiji citizens, of whom the *minkan* were the loudest, voiced their dissent with government policy. The government tightly controlled and regulated rights to speech and

²³ Kazuhiro Takii, *Itō Hirobumi: Japan's First Prime Minister and Father of the Meiji Constitution*, trans. Takechi Manabu (New York: Routledge, 2014), 91.

²⁴ Perez, *Japan Comes of Age*, 47–54.

gathering. The government left little room to work around the laws. The 1887 Peace Preservation Law, building upon other newspaper and public meetings laws to be mentioned shortly, placed strict penalties upon those who threatened “public tranquility.” Surveillance often continued after violations. The 1880 law regulating public meetings and associations banned “open-air” discussions of politics, and required the organizers to provide an agenda containing the names and addresses of lecturers. After all, whether topics seemed political or not, if the police deemed them “injurious to the public peace,” they would not be approved. In the case that topics were political and still earned police approval, classes of citizens including military personnel, police officers, teachers, students, and farming and technical workers were barred from attending such meetings or joining related associations. The laws on mass meeting were especially relevant during moments of great unrest like the Hibiya Riots after the Treaty of Portsmouth.²⁵

Restrictive information exchange laws constrained and influenced the political stances of vernacular newspapers important to this study to the extent that they harmed the government’s position more often than not. The 1875 Newspaper Law legislated several actions that newspapers were required to comply with. In the case that journalists tried to form a new publication, the filers supplied the title, frequency, names and addresses of all involved. The 1875 law mandated that new publications choose a chief editor if they had multiple editors of equal status. This way, in the event of a violation, there would be no confusion over which individual would receive prison time or fines. The law required that writers and translators of foreign articles sign their names at the end of articles relating to such a wide and vague range of topics as to be essentially all encompassing. Consequently, writers censored themselves to avoid government censorship and a disruption of news to their subscribers. These laws constrained the free dispersion of information and at times significantly harmed the government’s policy position by emboldening the press.²⁶

²⁵ Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, *Meiji Japan Through Contemporary Sources: Basic Documents, 1869-1894*, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1972), 43–44, 38, 39.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 32–34.

By 1895 the modern Japanese press, an institution closely tied to the *minkan*, became a force of public opinion, but not without several important changes since its inception in the early 1870s. A close relationship of patronage and information exchange between government and newspaper marked the first decade of the Meiji era, to the point that the newspapers were, “essentially, an arm of the government.”²⁷ Over time, the newspapers grew out of their relationship with the government and asserted their independence by reporting on political struggles and thus turned private clashes into public debates.²⁸ In the 1880s, newspapers furthered their autonomy by unofficially aligning with newborn political parties.²⁹ By the 1890s, the Japanese press became an even larger entity of information and, as historian James Huffman argues throughout *Creating a Public*, continued to seek profit through subscribers and advertisement, which was another sign of independence from government. This suggests a healthy relationship with, and dependence upon, readers. In 1894, the largest metropolitan newspaper, the *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun* accrued a daily circulation of over 100,000. While the daily circulation of the smallest “major” paper in 1894 was 15,000, the total circulation of newspapers published in Tokyo was 445,000.³⁰ Circulation alone may not be an effective measure of influence, but there can be few doubts that a growing number of Tokyoites were reading the *minkan* writers’ newspapers.

Along with independence from the government and dependence upon subscribers came two developments: the alignment of many newspapers with a political party and a new, variable cohort of writers and editors who pressed the limits of “public tranquility” while cultivating new public opinion.³¹ Again, these were *minkan*, ranging in political leaning from conservative to liberal. These papers’ political affiliations and combative stance towards the government turned more heads, further ballooning their growing influence. From 1895 to 1905, the press became exceptionally vociferous and critical of the government and even more so of the cabinet. Without mentioning the hundreds of instances of censorship from 1895 and on, the press effectively challenged the ability

²⁷ Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 51.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 68. On newspapers growing out of their relationships with government, see esp. chaps. 4-6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 111-31.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 386.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 186.

of one department of the cabinet to censor and suspend newspapers in 1897. The *26th Century* magazine, with its small subscription and relationship to Kuga Katsunan, *minkan* editor of the *Nihon Shimbun*, published an article detailing corruption among the imperial household minister's post. This implicated Itō Hirobumi in the corruption.³² It was a comparative blip on the radar until the more substantially circulated *Nihon* picked up the story. To delve into the back-and-forth that gave this event political currency would be cumbersome, but due to a political promise and the cabinet's waffling, the oligarchy eventually opted to revise the severity of its existing press laws. This event was part of a trend in which the press criticized and attacked the cabinet's policies more than ever before.³³ Despite this revision and the vehemence of criticism, Huffman and contemporaries agree that the oligarchy was still firmly in control of the Japanese press.³⁴ While the clique government may have still held on to power, the press gained a resonating victory in the sphere of information freedom—even if the fierce *Nihon Shimbun* produced the results.

III. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AN IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT: A GENERATION GAP

The generational gap that emerged during the late 1880s and early 1890s allowed a shift in attitude to emerge. Some Japanese began to voice dissatisfaction with Japan's international position. The younger generation, closely associated with the *minkan*, began to enter public life in force, and especially the opinion-forming realm of news. These "young men of Meiji" butted up against the ideas and policies of the "old men of the Tempo period."³⁵ The significantly different upbringings of each generation exacerbated the generational gap. The question of territorial sovereignty influenced the "young men of Meiji" and the oligarchy differently. The oligarchy grew up under the threat of foreign incursion.

³² Barbara Teters, "Press Freedom and the 26th Century Affair in Meiji Japan," *Modern Asian Studies* 6, no. 3 (May 1972): 345.

³³ Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 266–67.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 263.

³⁵ Masaaki Kōsaka, ed., *Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era*, trans. David Abosch (Tokyo: Pan-Pacific Press, 1958), 198.

They watched as Western countries pulled China asunder, which called Japanese regional military strength into question. The new generation may have been worried about territorial integrity, but were more likely influenced by the heroic and virile “tales of the Satsuma Rebellion.”³⁶ Perhaps these were men like Shintaro, in Tokutomi Kenjiro’s *Footprints in the Snow*, fascinated by outlandish and mythical tales of Saigo Takamori’s rebellion.³⁷ The young men had little sympathy for the seemingly static international position of Japan that the oligarchy’s gradual policies had conditioned. These exceptionally divergent upbringings produced the necessary framework to turn private Japanese thought to a militarist and fervent nationalism.

Elder statesmen and many senior officials of the oligarchy spoke of the threat to Japan’s territorial integrity in no uncertain terms. Yamagata Aritomo expressed a desire to maintain Japan’s independence in the face of international intervention.³⁸ Even the last shogun and “five western daimyo,” relics of a previous era, admitted the same concerns.³⁹ Related to territorial integrity was the less tangible question of national unity that concerned the oligarchy. If Japanese did not have a coalesced national identity, then apathy towards domestic and international events would arrive with that disunity. The disparate nature of the previous political structure and the ramifications of the Satsuma Rebellion served as warnings for the oligarchy’s burgeoning concern about a unified Japanese population. The sweeping societal changes implemented from Western societies threatened to dislocate Japanese identity further. The oligarchy’s concern with Japan’s unity and integrity resulted in the pursuit of a gradual policy of reform.

Incidents such as the bombardment of Kagoshima in 1863, which underscored tangible threats to Japan’s territorial integrity, likely tempered the positions of Yamagata and other Meiji leaders. The bombardment was a response to declining relations between the British Empire, Japanese shogun and Satsuma domain. The murder and injury of

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 198–99.

³⁷ Kenjiro Tokutomi, *Footprints in the Snow*, trans. Kenneth Strong (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), 74–75. At this point, Shintaro meets his Uncle Noda and discusses his short, but comical, involvement in taking up arms against the Saigo rebellion. His uncle remains a prominent figure in the story.

³⁸ Hackett, “The Meiji Leaders and Modernization,” 244.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 245.

foreigners allegedly disrespecting a high-ranking Samurai on the Tōkaidō road precipitated the bombardment.⁴⁰ A British fleet bombarded the town of Kagoshima after the British failed to extract an apology from the Satsuma domain.⁴¹ Undoubtedly, this left a mark in the minds of the oligarchs and soon-to-be officials of the Meiji government. They were acutely aware of the weakness of their military and thus the threat to their territorial integrity. Historian Sandra Davis posits that the Unequal Treaties themselves posed a direct threat to Japanese territorial integrity.⁴² After all, the Unequal Treaties essentially removed Japanese sovereignty in the treaty ports. Both the treaties and bombardment of Kagoshima were exemplary for their impact upon how the Meiji oligarchy approached governing and understood Japan's international position. However, their direction of pragmatism was met with impatience during the 1890s.

The new generation of Meiji could not empathize with the antiquated men and ideas that governed their nation's direction for nearly thirty years. Nakae Chōmin, a member of the Iwakura mission to the U.S. and a proponent of democracy, described "these oldsters" as "continu[ing] to cling to their managerial posts and maintain their right to leadership."⁴³ Addressing the oligarchs through his writings, he scathingly wrote: "your ideas like yourselves have become old."⁴⁴ Nakae's pointed mistrust of the government was most common among those younger than him entering public view around the late 1880s, and especially the *minkan*. This suggests that the elders' power began to expire. Yet, as a result of the informality and resonance of the oligarchy and elder statesmen, their power was bound to proliferate far beyond 1905. In 1905, informally designated elder statesmen held three cabinet positions, while the Satsuma-Choshu clique overwhelmingly dominated the rest of the positions.⁴⁵ The oligarchy was still in control, but losing its grip outside of the government. The younger

⁴⁰ Mitsuru Hashimoto, "Collision at Namamugi," trans. Betsey Scheiner, *Representations*, no. 18 (Spring 1987): 82.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 83–85.

⁴² Sandra T. W. Davis, "Treaty Revision, National Security, and Regional Cooperation: A *Mintō* Viewpoint," in *Japan in Transition: Thought and Action in the Meiji Era, 1868-1912*, ed. Hilary Conroy, Sandra T. W. Davis, and Wayne Patterson (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984), 151.

⁴³ Quoted in Kōsaka, *Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era*, 200.

⁴⁴ Quoted in *ibid.*

⁴⁵ Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War*, 38.

generation was disenchanted with oligarchic power and especially policy. In the estimate of men like Nakae, it was time for the relics of the Meiji restoration to step out of the way.

As part of the frustration with the elder generation of leaders, the new generation did not simply criticize the elders, but asserted the primacy of progress and future. These assertions and criticisms took place outside the government and emphasized the split between old and young, and government and non-government. Taguchi Ukichi in his work, *A Short History of Japanese Civilization* (*Nihon kaika shōshi*, 1881-84), for example, described a Japanese society that had always progressed, and was thus progressing during his time as well.⁴⁶ The emphasis of progress implied favoring a new generation over the old. Tokutomi Soho's important work, *The Future of Japan* (*Shōrai no Nihon*, 1887), was both an interpretation of the Meiji restoration and a prediction for the future. He conjectured that Meiji society was on its way to a society run by the many, not the few — another shot at the oligarchic structure.⁴⁷ Popular literature of the late 1880s also adopted a predictive character and even sought utopia in its fictions.⁴⁸ The continued concern with progress and the future was one aspect of a larger movement in which the oligarchy was uninformed of its historical position and thus not fit to lead. The obsession with progress and the ineffective power of the oligarchs compounded the disenchantment with the Meiji power structure and tended to place younger people in a dichotomous mindset: one is either with the government or against the government; with the nation or against the nation. This rift that formed between the governed and government allowed for the depopulation of oligarchic modernization ideas among the younger generation. In its place, a new brand of militaristic nationalism grew especially in the minds of the *minkan*.

Some of the most influential members of the younger generation edited and wrote for newspapers. Additionally, the press was traditionally critical of the government and was a space that politically oriented individuals gathered in.⁴⁹ The overlap of critical young citizens and critical newsmen exacerbated the split between government and non-

⁴⁶ Peter Duus, "Whig History, Japanese Style: The *Min'yūsha* Historians and the Meiji Restoration," *Journal of Asian Studies* 33, no. 3 (May 1974): 418-19.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 420-21.

⁴⁸ Kōsaka, *Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era*, 192.

⁴⁹ Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War*, 52.

government voices. The younger generation of politically active citizens established four of the most influential newspapers of the mid-Meiji in the late 1880s and early 1890s.⁵⁰ They were Tokutomi Sohō's *Kokumin Shimbun*, Kuga Katsunan's *Nihon Shimbun*, Murayama Ryōhei's *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, and Kuroiwa Shūroku's *Yorozu Chōhō*. Each of these men were in their early and mid-thirties by 1895. It is neither a coincidence that these papers were either unaligned with a party or skeptical of oligarchy policy (with the exception of Tokutomi's *Kokumin* after its reorientation around 1899).⁵¹ Their place as major metropolitan newspapers and the accompanying circulation also marked their influence.⁵² Again the salient point here is that the newspapers, composed of young private citizens with growing intellectual currency, pitted themselves against the government and their policies. With the exception of a handful of defectors like Tokutomi, these newspapers pushed the anti-government position with great fervor as their ideological positions became increasingly militaristic and impassioned.

The division between government and non-government, or mostly newspapermen in this case, follows accordingly in the news reports of the decade. A new fiery nationalism and militarism often existed alongside an anti-government position, suggesting that the two positions were closely related. The Triple Intervention and the Treaty of Portsmouth were the most strenuous circumstances of international inequality that the Japanese government had lost a handle on, and exacerbated the division. During the week from May 11 to 18, following the revelation of the Triple Intervention, the vernacular press shifted to attacking the government position, leading many papers to suffer suspension.⁵³ The *Mainichi Shimbun* compared the Intervention to the Treaty of San Stefano between the Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire, and compared Itō Hirobumi to Prince Gortschakoff—a deliberate and pointed insult.⁵⁴ The *Nihon, Hōchi* and several others agreed that Chinese diplomacy was far superior to Japan's to the point that a cult of Li Hung Chang, the Chinese

⁵⁰ Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 187–195.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, 386.

⁵³ "The Spirit of the Vernacular Press," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 18, 1895.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

plenipotentiary, seemed to proliferate for a few moments.⁵⁵ The *Nichi nichu* somehow managed to hold the Diet accountable for Japan's misfortune at the negotiating table.⁵⁶ No government official was unscathed. Viscount Tani Tateki (Kanjō), a military man associated with the Meiji cabinet, considered it foolish to resist the intervention.⁵⁷ Like his elder colleagues, he favored a slow and measured approach to international issues. A week later, the *Kokumin* and *Nihon* redoubled their disgust blaming cabinets and ministers while demanding their resignations.⁵⁸ The press became absolutely fire-mouthed in their dedication to lambast government position and policy after the Triple Intervention. They were however not interested in the pragmatic position that weighed the potential costs of a war with a "great power" cohort, or the potential for military personnel exhaustion. When directed at those "oldsters," the *minkan* considered their anger about Japan's degraded international position valid. A militaristic and nationalist impulse would grow in the *minkan's* disapproval with oligarchy policy.⁵⁹

The Treaty of Portsmouth produced similarly clear evidence of a split between the lofty oligarchs and the increasingly peopled newspapers. The *Kokumin*, a government-oriented organ by 1905, wrote in opposition to the *Tokyo Asahi*, *Nihon*, and *Jiji*, claiming that the treaty terms were not as degrading as these anti-government papers claimed.⁶⁰ On September 4, the *Nihon* attacked in a familiar way, claiming that the Russians were "astute" in their negotiations while the Japanese were "soft."⁶¹ The private sector again derided Japanese diplomacy. On the same date, the *Japan Times* reported that Baron Shibusawa Eiichi, ostensibly a man of the old guard, claimed the purposes of war had been achieved.⁶² The pro-cabinet faction made clear their favor with the Treaty of Portsmouth. Saionji Kinmochi, soon to be prime minister through a political party bargain

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ "Viscount Tani on National Defence," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 18, 1895.

⁵⁸ "Editorial Notes: Some Extremists on the Return of Manchuria," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 25, 1895.

⁵⁹ For further accounts, see "The Vernacular Press on the Treaty of Peace," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 18, 1895; "Tokyo Citizens and the Conclusion of the Peace," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 5, 1895. "The Spirit of the Vernacular Press During the Week," *Japan Weekly Mail*, June 1, 1895.

⁶⁰ "The Japanese Press," *Japan Times*, September 1, 1905.

⁶¹ "The Japanese Press," *Japan Times*, September 4, 1905.

⁶² "Views on the Peace," *Japan Times*, September 4, 1905.

with the ruling government, felt the peace was generally a decent deal.⁶³ Yamagata Aritomo, addressing the public after the Hibiya Riot, cited the uncertainty of fighting a “great power” like Russia and tried to remind the citizens of the importance of peace in the light of such high stakes.⁶⁴ But these quiet approvals were rebuffed by the growing voice of anger in the press and on the streets. One apex of this widening rift was the Hibiya Incendiary Riot. Protestors attacked police and police boxes by the dozen. For its government associations, the *Kokumin Shimbun*’s offices were attacked and burned on September 5. The protestors escalated the riot’s severity by attempting to burn the home minister’s house.⁶⁵ The press only expressed further furor at the way the cabinet and Tokyo police had dealt with the riot. In this way, the Hibiya Riot represents a climax for the *minkan*’s vile disillusion with oligarchic policy.

It is impossible to know the full extent of how much the protestors associated the government with the oligarchs and their own position with *minkan* interests. However, it is arguable that decisions resulting in Japan’s diminished international position by *any* government, oligarch or not, would have been met with vile disapproval. However, even if the protestors were simply in it for the sake of violence, they clearly attacked government symbols. Perhaps the public opinion that the *minkan* journalists were curating for a dozen years was finally provoked to insurrection against the government. In that sense, the Hibiya Riot may have been the product of the Triple Intervention’s legacy and ongoing charges of the press just as much as the treaty terms alone. If the anti-government position among the *minkan* was not so clear in 1895, it had become obvious by 1905.

The generational division that began to emerge in the late 1880s was not so clearly delineated along public and private lines. By 1905, however, the gap between those in power and those with a powerful voice emerged in Hibiya. What might have been a generational changing of the guard morphed into a vigorous anti-government stance. The alteration allowed

⁶³ Brown, “The Great Tokyo Riot,” 55–56; “The Political Parties and the Peace,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, September 9, 1905.

⁶⁴ “Marshal Yamagata on the War and Peace,” *Japan Times*, September 11, 1905.

⁶⁵ For primary accounts of the Hibiya Riots, see “Rioting in Tokyo,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, September 9, 1905. For further synthesis on the Hibiya Riots, see Brown, “The Great Tokyo Riot.”

a youthful turn towards conservative nationalism so that the generational divide extended to areas of political and foreign relations ideology. The oligarchs failed to co-opt and control the incendiary words of journalists and opinion shapers. The oligarchs were no longer operating in the power vacuum where “civilization and enlightenment” and “rich country, strong army” were sufficient policies to capture disparate ideas. In one way, the generational division that allowed for the ballooning of a fierce nationalistic position after the Triple Intervention can be seen as a failure of the oligarchy. In another way, as Pyle argues above, it can be seen as the unhinging of a population deeply perturbed by the exhaustive change of Westernization practices—also a process that the oligarchy helped initiate. Nonetheless, the elder statesmen and oligarchy were probably unequipped to respond to the sweeping changes that their actions produced. Their use of confining press laws to control information proved to be either ineffective or produced unintended consequences. The strangling of war information under the guise of war secrets pushed the people so far out of touch with actual coverage of the war as to give them the false belief that both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars were uncontested victories.⁶⁶ So, the generational division that produced an anti-government and conservative nationalist position was simultaneously the product of the oligarchy’s decision making as it was the broader effects of a nation forcibly integrating itself into a Western world.

IV. THE PROLIFERATION OF CONSERVATIVE NATIONALISM IN VERNACULAR NEWSPAPERS

The sentiment that grew significantly among the *minkan* following the Sino-Japanese War—what I call conservative nationalism—may be characterized by three or four distinct, sometimes overlapping features: a pro-war and pro-military stance pursued particularly to resolve Japan’s regional conflicts; an increased belief in national superiority fueled by the certainty of victory in war; an historical mindset that emphasized the Meiji government’s achievements; and, an anti-foreign spirit. This set of ideas was not restricted to any one political party or group of people and does

⁶⁶ Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War*, 143; Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 206–10.

not constitute a political platform. At first, after the Triple Intervention of 1895, the response may seem to have been essentially reactionary and knee-jerk, but over the ensuing decade it constituted a distinct and recognizable position. This definition of conservative nationalism fits snugly inside Japanism, but Japanism does not fit into conservative nationalism.⁶⁷

Even if Japanism had become an overwhelming part of most public individuals' ideology by the 1890s as Huffman writes, government leaders and newsmen expressed it in different ways.⁶⁸ Conservative nationalism gained popular currency and a distinctly audible voice in the press by 1900.⁶⁹ Historian Frank Iklé proposes that Japanism and Japan's ideological turn to a militaristic nationalism was a direct result of the Sino-Japanese War.⁷⁰ Anti-foreignism was not necessarily pursued for its own sake, nor did it consistently mean anti-Westernism, but actually was an effective way of establishing what was Japanese and thus domestic unity.⁷¹ Pyle offers that Japan's turn to Japanism may have been due to its "historical predicament" of being both "modern and Japanese."⁷² Indeed "[f]or Tokutomi [Sohō] national pride was a matter of military victories, territorial acquisition, and the revival of martial values."⁷³ It is this infectious and often tautological turn to conservative nationalism and its characteristics that I shall chart through the three events of the Triple Intervention, the revision of the Unequal Treaties, and the Treaty of Portsmouth. It is important to realize that the four aforementioned features of conservative nationalism are inherently tied to foreign goals. A pro-military stance, national superiority, an historical mindset, and anti-foreignism together existed to serve one purpose. Each of these positions implied an international other that Japan was superior to and required an effective military to rise above. This was Japan's reaction to the continuing

⁶⁷ What I have chosen to term as conservative nationalism has also been referred to as Japanism (*nihonshugi*), but I prefer not to use Japanism because it tends to imply a cultural superiority and uniqueness that I am comparatively less concerned with, if at all.

⁶⁸ Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 272–73.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 222.

⁷⁰ Frank W. Iklé, "The Triple Intervention: Japan's Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism," *Monumenta Nipponica* 22, nos. 1-2 (1967): 129.

⁷¹ Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 38–39, 122.

⁷² Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan*, 190, 192–93.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 198.

international inequality that had breathed its first breath in Japan's first Unequal Treaty of 1858 and continued to live on through the Triple Intervention. Fukazawa Yukichi was correct when he proclaimed, "we have no political problems except foreign policy problems."⁷⁴ A domestic platform that firmly attached itself to international goals even infected Fukuzawa, the standard bearer of "civilization and enlightenment."

Conservative nationalism tended to rise and fall with the events that Japan confronted. Tensions with foreigners heightened after the Triple Intervention and Treaty of Portsmouth, but seemed to drop down to a barely audible whisper around the time the revised treaties went into effect. The same was true concerning the obsession with military growth that press and citizen alike seemed to hold. Newspapers, however, consistently exalted the Meiji Empire and its achievements. Nonetheless, a precise investigation is necessary to identify the iterations of conservative nationalism during the revision of the Unequal Treaties. Reading the revision event as part of this movement, however, gives it clear currency in the upward trend to conservative nationalism. Its importance as a Japanese international event further emphasizes its importance in this study, whether the tinges of anti-foreignism can be recorded or not. The militarist was mollified by Japan's revision of the Unequal Treaties and its implications, but comparatively concerned with foreigners living in Japan at the time of treaty revision. Furthermore, considering this event as positive for Japan's international position and an intermediary between two events of drastic outrage, the tinges of anti-foreignism become more significant. The trend towards conservative nationalism, a reaction to Japan's sliding international position, continued even alongside a positive international event. In order to seat these sentiments in both their particular context and the larger trend of conservative nationalism, a close examination of a handful of exemplary and influential newspapers' reactions to the three events is necessary.

The *Nihon Shimbun* was founded by Kuga Katsunan on February 11, 1889. The *Nihon* emerged with politics and nationalism—on that same day, a "Shinto nationalist" assassinated Mori Arinori and the Emperor Meiji awarded the Japanese people a constitution.⁷⁵ Kuga Katsunan was

⁷⁴ Quoted in Marius B. Jansen, "Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan," in *Political Development in Modern Japan: Studies in the Modernization of Japan*, ed. Robert E. Ward (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 186–87.

⁷⁵ Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 150.

the editor of the *Nihon Shimbun* and a member of the Political Education Society (*Seikyōsha*).⁷⁶ The *Japan Weekly Mail* characterized Kuga's *Nihon Shimbun* as "chauvinist," but they "loved it for its outspokenness."⁷⁷ The verdict that the *Nihon's* attitude was chauvinist neither escapes current scholars. Huffman writes that "an impassioned reader of Kuga's chauvinistic *Nihon*" was responsible for the attempted assassination of Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu.⁷⁸ The sentiments of the *Nihon* represented the radical chauvinist end of politically tenable positions.⁷⁹ The *Nihon* adopted a fiercely nationalistic and consistently pro-war stance.

Before the Triple Intervention emerged, the *Nihon* was arguing for the resumption of war and using its columns to insult China. In early April, the *Nihon* discussed Chinese sailors accidentally firing on a Japanese ship with a peace flag.⁸⁰ Along with other newspapers, the *Nihon* described the act as inexcusable and advocated the immediate resumption of belligerence. In the same week, the *Nihon* discussed China's "former greatness" and the possibility of being swallowed up whole by Japan.⁸¹ The *Nihon's* columns also contained the incredible achievements that the Meiji emperor's reign had achieved compared to the "whole annals of the Empire."⁸² The *Nihon*, operating in the atmosphere of the late 1880s, was concerned with Meiji Japan's historical position. The concern for Japan's position in history reflected the concern for the greatness of Japanese achievements. The nationalism in its columns reflected upon the past to magnify current achievements. This intractable anger and deep concern for Japan's prestige existed inside the *Nihon* long before the Triple Intervention's insult.

For the *Nihon Shimbun's* writers, the Triple Intervention was a scar that they would not forgive or forget. As the Japanese populace grew impatient of the original Treaty of Shimonoseki not being ratified, public opinion shifted:

⁷⁶ Kōsaka, *Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era*, 210–11.

⁷⁷ "Chinese and Mixed Residence," *Japan Weekly Mail*, July 1, 1899.

⁷⁸ Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 157.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 386–87.

⁸⁰ "The Spirit of the Vernacular Press," *Japan Weekly Mail*, April 13, 1895.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² "The Spirit of the Vernacular Press," *Japan Weekly Mail*, April 27, 1895.

The feeling in Tokyo, which has all along been in favour of peace, has of late completely veered around. In the streets, the schools, the stores, people are eagerly discussing an immediate renewal of hostilities. It is the popular verdict that China has trifled too long with Japan's magnanimous patience...⁸³

The *Nihon* was outspoken in its support of this act and was suspended.⁸⁴ After the terms of the intervention surfaced, the *Nihon* queried its readers, "who that has blood in his viens [*sic*] can read it without shedding tears?"⁸⁵ The insult of the Triple Intervention questioned the *Nihon* and its readers' pride in nation. The *Nihon* so frequently incurred suspension in the following weeks that accounts of its words appeared with little consistency in the *Japan Weekly Mail*. Still, when the *Nihon* was periodically relieved of its muzzle, it barked loudly. Together with another newspaper, the *Nihon* advocated the return of Manchuria to Japanese possession. The correspondence section of the *Nihon* included letters ranging from dry sarcasm lauding a wonderful peace, to a stark suicide note—both addressed to Itō Hirobumi.⁸⁶ The *Nihon* incurred further suspension for this and other transgressions, emphasizing that what escaped censorship was worth the inevitable gag.⁸⁷ The columns of the *Nihon* glowed red with anger and passion. Their disgust for the peace was combined with their unquestioned sense of superiority to other nations that made the peace altogether baffling and enraging. It was a reaction to the independence that the *Nihon Shimbun* thought Japan had secured.

During the time leading up to the promulgation of the revised treaties, the *Nihon* exhibited its typical anti-foreign spirit. In a discussion of mixed residence (*zakkyo*), the newspaper described expatriates in Japan as the lowest classes.⁸⁸ It admitted the "cleanliness" of high societies across the globe but did not believe that foreigners of high class were migrating to Japan. On the date of promulgation, an American murdered two Japanese women and another expatriate. It was an immediate scandal. The *Nihon* took advantage of the event to sew fear in its readers, claiming that it was

⁸³ "The Popular Verdict," *Japan Weekly Mail*, April 20, 1895.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ "The Vernacular Press on the Treaty of Peace," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 18, 1895.

⁸⁶ "Some Extremists on the Return of Manchuria," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 25, 1895.

⁸⁷ "Summary of News," *Japan Weekly Mail*, June 1, 1895.

⁸⁸ "Chinese and Mixed Residence," *Japan Weekly Mail*, July 1, 1899.

merely the beginning of a new trend.⁸⁹ The *Nihon* also disputed the education minister's announcement on the revision of the Unequal Treaties. Other ministers issued announcements, but the *Nihon* took issue with the education minister's belief that a student's behavior reflected upon a nation's prestige. According to the *Mail*, the *Nihon* was apparently unperturbed by "rude and violent demonstrations towards foreigners" because they were not related to Japan's image.⁹⁰ The *Mail* offered its own dissent alleging that the *Nihon*'s opinions were a less-than-tacit approval of anti-foreignism. The *Nihon*, in its efforts to be more Japanese and patriotic, was exceptionally focused on what was not Japanese. This was a less combative way to express its conservative and nationalist political ideology, but as Gluck writes, it was another way of demarcating what was Japanese, and became a form of nationalism in itself.⁹¹

The Treaty of Portsmouth incensed the *Nihon* in a similar manner to the Triple Intervention. On September 4, the *Nihon* thought the Japanese negotiators employed "too much spirit of self-restraint" and referred to the Russian negotiators as "astute."⁹² Again the Japanese diplomats and government failed against superior negotiators. Again the cabinet faced the angered newsmen. On the first of September, the *Nihon* referred to this peace as simply another iteration of the Triple Intervention.⁹³ The Intervention entered Japanese historical timeline as a great insult, but to endure two reward-depriving interventions in a decade was likely unfathomable. No amount of posturing by the government would deprive the newspapers and people of their disgust. The *Nihon* did not blink when the city of Tokyo rioted in violent disapproval of oligarchy and treaty. Relayed through the *Japan Times*, the *Nihon*'s position was that the rioting was "the result of unbearable dissatisfaction on the part of those who are qualified to think and weigh matters."⁹⁴ In other words, only idiots were not enraged. Approval of open insurrection was a large step even for a paper that consistently published scathing articles on the government. In general, the *Nihon*'s sentiment was that the Japanese "sense of triumph

⁸⁹ "Mixed Residence and Foreign Immigration," *Japan Times*, July 23, 1899.

⁹⁰ "The *Nippon* and the Minister of Education's Instruction," *Japan Weekly Mail*, July 8, 1899.

⁹¹ Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 128.

⁹² "The Japanese Press," *Japan Times*, September 4, 1905.

⁹³ "The Japanese Press on the Peace," *Japan Weekly Mail*, September 9, 1905.

⁹⁴ "The Japanese Press," *Japan Times*, September 6, 1905.

[was] exchanged for one of defeat.”⁹⁵ Throughout this crisis, the *Nihon* continually piled their words of disapproval upon the contemporary government and even went as far as to withdraw blame from Russia. For the *Nihon*, the Treaty of Portsmouth was a second iteration of the Triple Intervention. The Treaty of Portsmouth reminded many of the Triple Intervention’s legacy of insult. The Japanese victory over the Russian Empire presumed a significant reward, but again the spoils were not enough to match the international position that Japan had allegedly ascended to.

The *Kokumin Shimbun*, established by the prodigious Tokutomi Sohō in 1890, initially took the line of “nonpartisan but essentially popular, anticabinet philosophy that Tokutomi labeled commonerism (*heiminshugi*).”⁹⁶ Tokutomi was a well-known author whose work, *The Future of Japan* (*Shōrai no Nihon*), was a bestseller when he was just twenty-four.⁹⁷ His paper was meant to be a popularly read newspaper, but given Tokutomi’s background as a member of the People’s Friend Society (*Min’yūsha*), an intellectual society and publishing group, it probably contained intellectually tinged articles. In 1899, the *Kokumin* reached a daily circulation height of 30,000 before dropping to 18,000 in 1903.⁹⁸ This was likely due to its growing ties with government officials—in 1905, the *Japan Times* characterized it as “semi-official”—that likely drew a barrier between itself and its readers.⁹⁹ Reflected by the *Kokumin*’s change in orientation was Tokutomi’s personal shift in political views. Much has been written about Tokutomi’s “change of heart,” but it is enough to say that his ideological position changed from advocacy for a democratic and commercially strong Japan, to an imperialist, militaristic position “baptized in the gospel of power,” that found patronage in the government.¹⁰⁰ During this decade, the *Kokumin* shifted greatly across the political spectrum. In the case of the Treaty of Portsmouth, this newspaper represents a counterweight to the vociferous anger directed at the

⁹⁵ “The Japanese Press on the Peace,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, September 9, 1905.

⁹⁶ Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 191.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 189.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 386–87.

⁹⁹ “The Japanese Press,” *Japan Times*, September 1, 1905.

¹⁰⁰ John D. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō, 1863-1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 126–30, 234–40.

government. However, it was just as concerned as its contemporaries with Japan's international position and inequality.

The *Kokumin*, like its contemporaries, aired its support for the trend of militarism. With patience running thinner, the *Kokumin* suggested that Japanese troops march into Peking to extract their terms of victory.¹⁰¹ The news organization also intimated that the Chinese emperor's hesitance to ratify the original peace treaty ending the Sino-Japanese War was a grave insult to the Japanese.¹⁰² The *Kokumin's* position was not only bellicose, but extremely reverent of the military. In their columns, they accused a contemporary of "an attempt to hold the army responsible for diplomatic issues."¹⁰³ The *Kokumin* simultaneously exonerated the military of blame—not that the claim was considered credible—and referred again to "diplomatic issues" as the true source of friction. Attempting to put words in the mouth of the military, the newspaper puffed out its chest claiming that the Japanese military would be willing to fight a stronger foe if the opportunity presented itself.¹⁰⁴ The *Kokumin* sounded a lot like the *Nihon*. These reactions from the former proponent of commonerism especially show that the *Kokumin* presented military strength as a viable solution to Japan's international power conundrum. The newspaper was annoyed with the honest tactic of waiting for a ratification response and finally believed that only a powerful military would bring Japan the solution of a bountiful victory.

While the *Kokumin* and *Nihon* were in agreement after the Triple Intervention, the *Kokumin* aligned differently during the summer of 1899. Their new position included serious considerations for the proper treatment of foreigners in Japan. Applauding the imperial rescript on treaty revision, their columns ridiculed those remaining in Japan who considered anti-foreignism consistent with patriotism.¹⁰⁵ Their columns therefore were aimed at the *Nihon* when it did not give importance to the treatment of foreigners in a column mentioned above. This signaled a growing alignment with the government, of which three cabinet ministers and the emperor issued statements on the positive treatment of foreigners.

¹⁰¹ "The Spirit of the Vernacular Press During the Week," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 4, 1895.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ "The Spirit of the Vernacular Press During the Week," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 11, 1895.

¹⁰⁴ "The Spirit of the Vernacular Press During the Week," *Japan Weekly Mail*, June 1, 1895.

¹⁰⁵ "The Vernacular Press on the Imperial Rescripts," *Japan Weekly Mail*, July 8, 1899.

Despite this posturing, the *Kokumin* printed an apprehension-tinged article titled “When you are in Rome do as the Romans do.”¹⁰⁶ This article asked that foreigners display the national flag “on the occasion of national ceremonies” and respect temple customs, among other things. It was not an anti-foreign article, but that the government-aligned organ was airing its apprehensions about unifying customs reminded readers of the tense cultural encounters between foreigners and Japanese. Aside from those concerns, the press did seem to agree, in the words of the *Kokumin*, that the revision of the Unequal Treaties was the “greatest achievement in Japanese history.”¹⁰⁷ This revision was so great because it seemed to place Japan on an equal footing with the Western world. It was the international equalizer that apprehensive Japanese citizens were seeking for their insults.

The *Kokumin*'s words following the Treaty of Portsmouth are much less of a concern than its role as a symbol of government. By 1905 it became common knowledge that the newspaper was receiving dependable information and financial support from the government.¹⁰⁸ In Tokyo, a growing group of protestors that migrated from Hibiya Park attacked the offices of the *Kokumin Shimbun*.¹⁰⁹ The frustrations that many felt for the Treaty of Portsmouth turned into violent actions against government symbols. Although the attack on the offices and other places was unplanned, the Hibiya Park Riot was in no sense some aberration or accident of September 5, 1905. The group that planned the initial demonstration was the *Rengōkai*. This group's general ideology was the advocacy for a strong foreign policy.¹¹⁰ The protestors that gathered, composed of travelers from the provinces, rowdy students, and more, violently clashed with the peacekeeping police after the local police prohibited their gathering.¹¹¹ After defecting from the *minkan* ranks of nationalism and adopting the maligned position of cabinet pragmatism, the *Kokumin* incurred the wrath of physical disapproval. Violence against

¹⁰⁶ “The U.S. Representative and the Japanese Press,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, July 22, 1899; “The Japanese Press,” *Japan Times*, July 15, 1899.

¹⁰⁷ “The Seventeenth and the Vernacular Press,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, July 22, 1899.

¹⁰⁸ Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 292–93.

¹⁰⁹ Brown, “The Great Tokyo Riot,” 153–57.

¹¹⁰ Brown, “The Great Tokyo Riot,” 56–57.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 119–42.

the *Kokumin* communicated the vile disapproval of the Treaty of Portsmouth.¹¹²

The renowned Fukuzawa Yukichi established the *Jiji Shinpō* in 1882. He had written for the *Meiji Six Magazine* and was not shy of writing. The daily newspaper was, however, a new undertaking for Fukuzawa.¹¹³ As mentioned above, Fukuzawa was the primary proponent of the “civilization and enlightenment” movement and probably held some credibility among the oligarchy. Regardless, he and his editorial staff did not profess to have political ties, nor did they seem to be accused of partisanship. The *Jiji* focused on economic issues and was unapologetic in its level of advertising.¹¹⁴ The *Jiji*’s daily circulation was less than 20,000 in 1895, but rocketed to 86,000 in 1899 before dropping by half in four years’ time.¹¹⁵ Regardless of this erratic fluctuation, the paper was a mainstay in Tokyo beyond Fukuzawa’s death in 1901. Perhaps Fukuzawa’s absence from the paper caused the decline in readership. Despite both its focus on economic stories and its association with Fukuzawa Yukichi, the *Jiji Shinpō* exhibited conservative nationalist characteristics similar to other newspapers.

The *Jiji*’s sentiments following the Triple Intervention were more measured than most of its contemporaries, but seem to align best with this article’s epigraph and the Iklé’s insights. Iklé argues that the Triple Intervention baptized many Japanese with the ideology of “might makes right.”¹¹⁶ *Gashin shōtan*, mentioned as an epigraph above, emphasized the biding of time for the sake of revenge, and exemplified the *Jiji*’s own position. If Japan were patient and built its military to assert its will, it would be an equal on the stage of international affairs. According to the *Japan Weekly Mail*’s summary, the *Jiji* concluded in May of 1895 that “justice and sentiment find no place in modern diplomacy but that all questions are in practice solved by mere brute force.”¹¹⁷ A week later, the

¹¹² The idea of violence as a form of communication was taken from Hara Kazuo in a discussion of Okuazaki Kenzo and his methods of dealing with war memory. See Kazuo Hara, *Camera Obtrusa: The Action Documentaries of Hara Kazuo*, trans. Pat Noonan and Takuo Yasuda (New York: Kaya Press, 2009), 169.

¹¹³ Huffman, *Creating a Public*, 145–48.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 145–48, 235.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 386–87.

¹¹⁶ Iklé, “The Triple Intervention,” 129.

¹¹⁷ “The Spirit of the Vernacular Press During the Week,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 11, 1895.

Jiji conveyed its resignation to the new peace and retroactive cession of Liaotung, but not for nothing.¹¹⁸ The purpose again was to build a stronger nation for the future defense of its interests. This was different than the impassioned *Jiji* that was suspended at the end of April for its incendiary comments.¹¹⁹ The comments resulting in its suspension were nonetheless representative of the immediate feelings of the public. Its bitter resignation to the treaty's terms was protected by its even-handed support of military growth. The *Jiji* proposed military growth as the solution to Japan's international inequality.

The *Jiji*, having been a more moderate voice during the Triple Intervention, again adopted a measured tone during the promulgation of the Unequal Treaties. In fact, the newspaper seemed to write as if Japan had not suffered the Triple Intervention yet, during a time that a young Japan was seeking the approval of foreign nations. The *Jiji* supported the Imperial rescript advising Japanese to act with circumspection and especially emphasized the education minister's instructions to students.¹²⁰ For the *Jiji*, the respect of foreigners was paramount to maintaining Japan's international reputation. The *Jiji* not only emphasized respect given to foreigners, but praised the "fair and liberal" view that foreigners had adopted of Japan.¹²¹ Their columns further admonished any single Japanese that would be rude to a foreigner as contradicting the emperor and country. This déjà vu of lofty reverence for foreigners was not without a catch. The *Jiji* felt that the revision finally put them on equal ground with Western countries and was not simply an entry point into the "comity of nations."¹²² This concern for the "comity of nations" and Japan's international position was again representative of the press. Despite the insult of the Triple Intervention, the Japanese press was still convinced of Japan's ability to reach parity with Western countries. It was the unfortunate folly of a younger sibling that believed they were equal to their elders because of a formality—the revision of the Unequal Treaties.

The *Jiji* again took a comparatively moderate view of the Japanese position after Portsmouth. The *Jiji*, unlike some of its contemporaries, was

¹¹⁸ "The Vernacular Press on the Treaty of Peace," *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 18, 1895.

¹¹⁹ "Summary of News," *Japan Weekly Mail*, April 27, 1895.

¹²⁰ "The Imperial Rescript and Ministerial Instructions," *Japan Times*, July 4, 1899; "The Vernacular Press on the Imperial Rescript," *Japan Weekly Mail*, July 8, 1899.

¹²¹ "The Seventeenth and the Vernacular Press," *Japan Weekly Mail*, July 22, 1899.

¹²² "The Japanese Press," *Japan Times*, July 18, 1899.

not fixated upon the acquisition of an indemnity, but found it unacceptable that half of the Sakhalin islands, all of which had been occupied by the Japanese, should be relinquished to the Russians.¹²³ In its similarly mellow tone, the *Jiji* also wrote that the number one issue after the war was to properly aid the families of veterans.¹²⁴ The *Jiji*'s moderation seemed to be chipped away as the Japanese press combined its anger. The *Jiji* along with the *Tokyo Asahi* invoked the Triple Intervention's insult, reminding its readers that in that instance a three-power force confronted Japan.¹²⁵ In other words, the Japanese nation and military, changed in both character and substance from ten years prior was powerful enough to deny the terms of Portsmouth and forcibly extract its desires. Moreover, the reminder of the Triple Intervention brought to question whether 1905 was the time to exact the vengeance that *gashin shōtan* implied. On the other hand, the *Jiji* was still concerned with Japan's international position. In the *Jiji*'s estimate, Japan was elevated to great power status by defeating Russia.¹²⁶ This was incongruent with the *Jiji*'s previous ideas that the revision of the Unequal Treaties placed Japan on equal footing with the West. Obviously misled by what the revised treaties meant for Japan, the *Jiji* again believed the victory over a great power would change its international prestige. The *Jiji* was not isolated from its contemporaries' furor with the Tokyo riots however. Like many of the metropolitan newspapers, perhaps nearly every one, the *Jiji* ended up calling for the cabinet's resignation as well.¹²⁷ The *Jiji* was not radical, but its insistence on power and international prestige throughout these three events shows just how the iterations of conservative nationalism permeated the press.

V. AFTERWORD AND CONCLUSION

The dissatisfaction with Japan's international position found a beginning in the vernacular press, but it may have also spread to other areas of

¹²³ "The Japanese Press," *Japan Times*, September 2, 1905.

¹²⁴ "The Japanese Press," *Japan Times*, September 1, 1905.

¹²⁵ "The Japanese Press on the Peace," *Japan Weekly Mail*, September 9, 1905.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

Japanese society. The same press that voiced a sharp anger towards government and international events had hundreds of thousands of readers across Tokyo and the countryside. The mouthy press likely contributed to the outburst at Hibiya through both its decade-long criticism of government and immediate furor with the peace treaty. These sentiments seemed to percolate into the general populace and the English-language press picked up many of these stories. The following accounts represent the same strain of conservative nationalism and distrust of government policy throughout the three principal events. These events are however not confined to the press and provide a broader finish to this article. Subsequent avenues of research might find their beginnings in this evidence.

The Triple Intervention, as shown, produced inflammatory reactions pointed in many directions. The treaty and its reaction were met with two imperial rescripts. A proclamation at the end of April 1895 warned Japanese to not be so inflammatory towards other nations.¹²⁸ A month later, following the revelation of the revised treaty of Shimonoseki, the emperor spoke of the enhanced “imperial glory” as he shared “the honor of the empire” with his citizens.¹²⁹ This announcement may have fulfilled two purposes: celebration of victory and a pacification (or at least an attempt) of the uneasy people. These were the uneasy people that refused to hang Japan’s national flag in celebration of the peace.¹³⁰ These were people that became aware of their position and sought to “take precautions against any repetition of such humiliations” by augmenting their navy to a size of 200,000 tons, for example.¹³¹ More indicative of the mindset was the confidence with which some people berated China and its military strength. The *Mail* reported that the young people of the population, “the students and *sōshi*,” desired that China repudiate the treaty so that the Japanese military could plow into Peking.¹³² Throughout the Sino-Japanese war, people like this were buying small replicated artworks of Japanese soldiers depicted as Western soldiers and Chinese as

¹²⁸ “The Imperial Proclamation,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, April 27, 1895.

¹²⁹ “Imperial Rescript,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 25, 1895.

¹³⁰ “Tokyo Citizens and the Conclusion of the Peace,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 25, 1895.

¹³¹ “The Spirit of the Vernacular Press During the Week,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 25, 1895.

¹³² “The Situation in Tokyo,” *Japan Weekly Mail*, May 11, 1895.

backwards and barbarous.¹³³ This amalgamation of anti-foreign spirit and militaristic confidence seemed to be a snapshot, if only anecdotal, of what was taking place outside of the *Nihon*, *Kokumin*, and *Jiji*.

Common people's reactions to the promulgation of the revised treaties seemed to reveal a similar undercurrent of anti-foreign spirit. Reactions appeared in contrast to foreign-friendly imperial rescripts and government announcements. The *Mainichi Shimbun* criticized Arthur Diosy, a foreign sociologist, for his research in Yoshiwara (a quarter of Tokyo known for prostitution). According to the *Mail*, he did however receive an audience with the emperor on August 5 despite being a foreigner.¹³⁴ In this example, Mr. Diosy received some of the criticism guided by Japanese apprehensions about foreigners, but the government position prevailed. In August 1899, the *Mail* wrote of an *Asahi* article that discussed the topic of Japanese children using pejorative terms to refer to foreigners.¹³⁵ The terms that the *Mail* editor claims to have heard included *ijin* (a homonym for "different person" and "barbarian"), *ketōjin* ("hairy foreigner") and *neko papa* (a term that combines the Japanese word for "cat" and an onomatopoeic term referencing the Anglo-Saxon languages). Children can hardly be representative of an adult population, but both the *Asahi* and *Mail* devoted an article to this topic. The editor of the *Mail* even included his personal experiences. These criticisms of foreigners were most likely due to the general concerns for mixed residence and were part of a longer trend of cultural encounter between foreigner and Japanese. Nonetheless, this intermediate and positive event for Japanese international position still seemed to reveal anti-foreign apprehensions among common people. Perhaps the newspapers' tone contributed to the grappling between foreigner and Japanese.

The reaction to the Treaty of Portsmouth, culminating, or at least reaching a climax, in the Hibiya Riot, seems to especially represent a broad Japanese reaction. The protestors reportedly "bore the flag of the Rising Sun draped in black."¹³⁶ So great was Portsmouth's insult that they

¹³³ Julia Meech-Pekarik, *The World of the Meiji Print: Impressions of a New Civilization* (New York: Weatherhill, 1986), 201–03.

¹³⁴ "Mr. Arthur Diosy," *Japan Weekly Mail*, August 5, 1899; "Notes on Current Events," *Japan Weekly Mail*, August 12, 1899.

¹³⁵ "Names Applied to Foreigners," *Japan Weekly Mail*, August 12, 1899.

¹³⁶ "Mass Meeting of the Kowa Doshikai," *Japan Times*, September 5, 1905.

mourned the death of their nation. It was hyperbole, but the imagery seemed to tap into a national feeling of disillusionment. Protestors putting forth this common sentiment and using violence as their means of communication gives further credibility to the level of seething anger. Perhaps, like some columnists, protestors felt the same sense of betrayal that emerged from their efforts at Westernization. The government's response was to impose martial law and gag the press. No one was satisfied with the peace terms—not even the Russians. During this riot, not only government symbols, but churches also suffered the wrath of rioters. Protesters did not attack the churches because they were symbols of a foreign presence. However, there is evidence that Japanese protestors injecting religion into the peace issue triggered this action. Regardless, the Russian Orthodox Church was staffed with a heavy police presence that rebuffed a small group of rioters. Furthermore, there is some hearsay evidence from Nagai Naohara, pastor of the Asakusa Church in Tokyo, that rioters were targeting foreign churches.¹³⁷ The rioting at Hibiya was composed of a deeply angered population. But again it is nearly impossible to argue that they felt the same dissatisfactions the *minkan* newsmen did. Perhaps it was violence for violence's sake, or maybe they had ingested the same concerns as their intellectual countrymen.

Insults to Japan's independence and international prestige triggered these variable and forceful responses from internationally concerned Tokyoite newsmen. *Minkan* shapers of public opinion could not understand the oligarchy's response to such smarting events because of the two groups' exceptionally divergent upbringings. The misunderstandings and gap in experience between two generations allowed new influential modes of thought, like bold nationalism and militarism, to proliferate. Still, the exhaustive and near-destructive changes of the Meiji restoration contributed to this search for a solution to contemporary international issues. The site of this proliferation was the press—where people with mastery of rhetoric gathered.

The opinion shapers in the press, concerned with Japan's position as a nascent international power, understood the Triple Intervention as their best reason to be upset. That agonizing interference reverberated across the decade to provide familiar reasons for dissatisfaction and furor, again

¹³⁷ Accounts on the topic of churches during the Hibiya Riot can be found in Brown, "The Great Tokyo Riot," 191–95. The dissertation also covers the several sites of destruction.

and again. Newsmen passionately wrote about topics of national prestige, military power, and the meddlesome foreigners. By 1905, long after the Triple Intervention had scarred many Japanese columnists, allies from the countryside and various classes voiced their concern at Hibiya. The extent to which commoners became complicit in the anti-cabinet and conservative nationalist trend is not clear, but the source of discord in Hibiya was different than a decade earlier. Perhaps the respected newsmen's stories had permeated the growing reading public to the extent that the cause for international superiority gained its loudest support in Hibiya. Regardless, it was never enough for the *minkan* that Japan was a middling partner in the international hierarchy, but that was no longer just a topic for the press to deliberate. Japan's international position became a public issue by 1905.

Glossary

- bummei kaika* (文明開化): “civilization and enlightenment.” A phrase representing key values of early Meiji modernization.
- fukoku kyōhei* (富国強兵): “Rich country, strong army.” A phrase representing key values of early Meiji modernization.
- gashin shōtan* (臥薪嘗胆): a Chinese proverb that literally means “to lie on wood and lick gall.” It is commonly interpreted to mean perseverance for the sake of vengeance.
- genrō* (元老): elder statesmen. The informal governing body that advised the emperor and cabinet.
- hanbatsu* (藩閥): “clique government.” Refers to the Meiji government that favored placing men from the former Satsuma and Choshu domains in high offices.
- heimin* (平民): Commoner.
- Jiji Shinpō* (時事新報): “Current Events.” Newspaper founded by Fukuzawa Yukichi.
- Kokumin Shimbum* (国民新聞): “Citizens Newspaper.” Newspaper founded by Tokutomi Sohō
- Kōwa Mondai Dōshi Rengōkai* (講和問題同志連合会): “Council of Fellow Activists on the Peace Question.”
- Meirokeisha* (明六社): “Meiji Six Society.” A group of early Meiji intellectuals, many of whom had traveled to the west, interested in considering the best ways for Japan to modernize.
- Meiroke zasshi* (明六雑誌): “Meiji Six Magazine.” The magazine in which the *Meirokeisha* explained their ideas.
- minkan* (民間): “Among the people.” Private and influential Japanese citizens that shaped public opinion, but were not a part of the government.
- Min'yūsha* (民友社): “People's Friend Society.” An intellectual society and publishing company closely associated with Tokutomi Sohō
- nihonshugi* (日本主義): Japanism. A complex political ideology that argued the cultural uniqueness and superiority of Japan.
- Nihon Shimbum* (日本新聞): “Japan Newspaper.” Newspaper founded by Kuga Katsunan.
- Seikyōsha* (政教社): “Political Learning Society.” An intellectual society and publishing company closely associated with Kuga Katsunan.
- shimbun* (新聞): “newspaper”
- sōshi* (壮士): “ruffian; young man in his prime”
- yoron* (世論): “public opinion”
- zakkō* (雑居): “mixed residence.” The revised Unequal Treaties gave foreigners the right to reside anywhere in Japan and was referred to as mixed residence.
- zenshinshugi* (漸進主義): “gradualism.” A political ideology that referred to the pace of modernization.

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Resisting Integration

Japanese-American Recreational Activities and Development of Civic Identity in Postwar Chicago

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Pat Amino was just fourteen years old when she relocated alone to Chicago in August 1945 after being released from Poston, one of the ten incarceration camps for Japanese-Americans during World War II (WWII). There, she joined her two older sisters who left Poston earlier to take up factory jobs in Chicago. On her first day of school at Waller High School (now Lincoln Park High School), she met many other Japanese-American girls. They formed an instant bond which bloomed into the Silhouettes Girls' Club, in which Nisei girls did everything together—bowling, talent shows, Blackhawks hockey games, and the occasional trip to Lake Geneva, Wisconsin. Together they played basketball and softball, and even organized their own dances. Pat recalls that the Silhouettes rented out Olivet Institute, a community center on the North Side of Chicago, for \$25 and decorated the room with crepe paper and balloons. They got their friend Hank to be the deejay, everyone to file into the room by the evening. The primary purpose was to dance, but “the night would proceed with all this mellow music and all these chairs, people sitting around, talking and all that, and it was just a real nice evening, a social evening.”¹

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¹ Alice Murata, “Stardust and Street of Dreams: Chicago Girls Clubs,” *Chicago History*, Spring 2001; Pat Aiko (Suzuki) Amino, interview by Mary Doi (May 30, 1999), in *REgenerations: Rebuilding Japanese American Families, Communities and Civil Rights in the Resettlement Era* (Oral History Project), vol. 1, *Chicago Region* (Los Angeles, CA: Japanese American National Museum, 2000), 49.

Pat's story is not uncommon among the twenty thousand Japanese-Americans who relocated to Chicago shortly after the war. In 1945, more than half of the evacuees who came to Chicago were under twenty-four years old.² Many of them left camp earlier than their parents and younger siblings to get a head start on employment. Stripped of the comfort that came with sharing close quarters with other Japanese-Americans and suddenly thrust into a strange city with no possibility of returning to the West Coast, many Japanese-Americans felt truly alone for the first time. Thus, school dances, recreational sports, and other modes of socialization provided Japanese-Americans a way to maintain a healthy social life in a white-dominated society they felt uneasy in. Weekends were something to look forward to; all-Nisei basketball and baseball teams played against other all-Nisei teams in tournaments at home or around the Midwest, there were picnics in parks all around town, young people went dance-hopping and bowling on Saturday nights. 1940s Chicago was a "fun time and place to grow up in," according to a Japanese-American interviewed decades later.³

Unfortunately, not much scholarship has been dedicated to the postwar recreational activities of Japanese-Americans in cities such as Chicago, St. Louis, New York, Columbus, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. A few general histories of recreational activities, mainly written for informational pamphlets and museum exhibitions, focus on recreational activities within the context of internment. Complete with black-and-white pictures of dancing Nisei girls and their swirling skirts or the intense face of a Nisei boy up at the bat, these writings work to remind the present Japanese-American community of their parents' past.⁴

The most in-depth academic study of Japanese-American recreational activities is available in Ellen Wu's book, *The Color of Success* (2014). Wu analyzes reports that discuss the recreational activities started in postwar Chicago for Japanese-Americans and explored Japanese-American assimilation into white society more broadly. Wu traces the organization of recreational activities to the 1947 report of the Social Analysis Committee (SAC), appointed by the Chicago Resettlers Committee (CRC)

² Murata, "Stardust and Street of Dreams."

³ Katie Sakata, interview by author, April 17, 2015.

⁴ For relevant images, see the "Organized Sports Leagues and Teams in Chicago" album in the Nikkei Legacy Project's Discover Nikkei program website, at <http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/nikkeialbum/albums/267/>.

to investigate the maladjustment of the Nisei. She argues that the Nisei organized these ethnically exclusive activities for two main reasons: to provide “attractive alternatives” to Nisei engaging in what was seen as “delinquent” behavior that undermined their image as “middle-class whites and fellow citizens” and to serve as a middle step in full Japanese-American integration to American society.⁵ The SAC understood, she writes, that resettlers needed to regain a sense of security and self-confidence damaged in the internment camps, and thus justified their participation in Nisei-only activities as a step in achieving the ultimate goal of integration.

This article looks at some of Wu’s sources, as well as other reports and writings, to advance, and at times refute, parts of Wu’s primary arguments on Japanese-American recreational activities in postwar Chicago. This article traces the creation of social activities to 1943, when young Nisei first arrived in Chicago. The young Nisei organized informal dances and gatherings in order to combat their loneliness in a city that felt impersonal and cold compared to the closeness of the internment camps. These dances were not always, contrary to officials concerned with Japanese-American resettlement, cesspools of delinquent behavior, but rather a safe space where Nisei reminisced about life in the camps and complained about Chicago. While many of the Nisei did in fact feel restless and not a part of the whole, they did not care too much about integration into American society, and even expressed resentment at such top-down calls for integration by national organizations such as the Japanese American Citizens League. Cognizant of the specific needs and sentiments of these resettlers in Chicago, the CRC organized so that they had representation from all groups and generations of Japanese-Americans, and that their activities focused on adjustment to the city of Chicago. In other words, the CRC organized activities with the hopes of getting Nisei to develop a civic attachment to Chicago rather than integration into American society at large.

Chicago was initially an attractive option for most internees looking to resettle. Newspapers such as the *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, the official newspaper of the Heart Mountain Internment Camp in Wyoming,

⁵ Ellen D. Wu, *The Color of Success: Asian Americans the Origins of the Model Minority* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 19, 37.

published several articles towards the imminent closing of the camp that portrayed Chicago as a welcoming city abundant in job opportunities and agencies ready to help settlers find employment and housing. One article, titled "Jobs Are Plentiful in Chicago," claimed that "resettlement prospects in the Chicago area were reported good," and that evacuees found work there as "stenographers, bookkeepers, accountants, welders, florists," and other skilled labor—an improvement from farm work before WWII. The article also praised the American Friends Service, a Quaker agency, for finding resettlers secure and well-paying jobs. The author assured, "the Friends. . . do not recommend a job unless current wages are assured. For instance, the Friends have set \$100 monthly as the minimum for stenographers, but have placed girls in positions drawing \$125."⁶ Another article published two weeks later praised the YWCA for helping the WRA give Nisei girls "a friendly welcome and help in finding a place to live," and for "interpreting with intelligence and understanding the problems of these loyal American citizens trapped in a war situation."⁷ Such articles interpreting the situation in Chicago promoted the illusion that it was welcoming to the resettlers and lured many Japanese-Americans to the city. By 1946, there were approximately 20,000 evacuees living in the area.⁸

However, a preliminary report of early Japanese-American resettlement prepared by Japanese-American sociologist Tamotsu Shibutani, titled *The First Year of Resettlement in Chicago* for the Evacuation and Resettlement Study at the University of California, suggested otherwise; it painted a very bleak picture of employment and housing prospects in Chicago. The report mentioned that, while jobs were plentiful in Chicago, finding a well-paying job was "rather difficult," and many employers even refused to take Japanese-Americans.⁹ For example, one college graduate was turned down by all CPA firms that he applied for:

⁶ "Jobs Are Plentiful in Chicago," *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, April 3, 1943.

⁷ "YWCA Aids Nisei Girls in Chicago," *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, April 17, 1943.

⁸ "Thousands of Nisei Discovering Homes and Security in Chicago," *New York Herald Tribune*, November 3, 1946.

⁹ Tamotsu Shibutani, *The First Year of the Resettlement of the Nisei in the Chicago Area: A Preliminary Classification of Materials and a Statement of Tentative Plans for Further Research* (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, March 1944), 50.

They were polite, yes. But no, they couldn't risk incurring their clients' antagonism by hiring a "Japanese." "But I'm not Japanese," he would argue. "I'm American." Most of the personnel men or employers were diplomatically cordial. They asked him to fill out forms and then said: "We'll call you." But they never did. One employer, however, had a rather disturbing retort to H-I's "but I'm not Japanese, I'm American." This man leaned across the desk and remarked, "but you sure as hell would look like one to my customers, and I can't afford that."¹⁰

Additionally, employment agencies, despite their success in helping Japanese-Americans find jobs as alleged by various newspapers, were often overwhelmed by staff shortages, leaving many resettlers to find jobs through their friends or family members.

The same report also mentioned that many resettlers had difficulty finding housing in Chicago, as many Japanese-Americans faced discrimination through "restrictive covenants against non-Caucasians," and "the attitude of the public towards the 'Japs.'" The report cited a recent Nisei settler who said "Our landlady gave us [one] week notice to move out. Some of the neighbors were threatening to break her windows and door glass unless she kicked us out. I know it's against regulations of the government to kick people out but I don't want to stay there anyway." Housing in Chicago was scarce to begin with, and the places that resettlers lived in were often dirty and infested with bedbugs—one resettler joked: "I'm getting pretty good at killing them. I'm thinking of putting them in a jar and presenting them to the lady for a present." Given the bleak housing situation and employment prospects in Chicago, the report concluded that the resettlers are "having difficulties in finding a place to call home." It noted the instability of the resettlers, who have "nothing definite and concrete to hang on to," for many Nisei "do not know where they will be living or what kind of work they will be doing next month." Some Japanese-Americans did not know whether they were going to stay in Chicago or move to other parts of the Midwest or back to the West Coast.¹¹

The report went on to mention that many Nisei did not like "the impersonal nature of Chicago itself"; exceptions to this general sentiment

¹⁰ Togo Tanaka, *Adjustment Problems of Chicago Resettlers* (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, February 1944), 47.

¹¹ Shibutani, *The First Year of the Resettlement*, 54 ("restrictive"), 56 ("our landlady"); 57 ("killing them," "difficulties"); 144.

were rare. The report quoted many Japanese-Americans who had many strong feelings about Chicago, evident in their lengthy responses. Many disliked “the dirtiness of the ‘L’ trains” and others described the city itself as dirty, since one “can’t even see beyond [their] nose because [they] breathe out black air.” Others complained about Chicagoans “who are in a hurry but don’t know where they are going,” and are “really vulgar.” Some thought that Chicago was “not as nice as St. Louis or Milwaukee.” One man said that “back home” —presumably the West Coast— “people used to smile,” while in Chicago, “people think you are flirting or something.” Interestingly, he questioned “why they speak about Japanese not being able to assimilate when you can see all these people around here who can’t even speak English.”¹² The urban nature of Chicago was a far cry from the West Coast and even the internment camps themselves.

The report diagnosed resettlers as, “genuinely lonely,” and explained that, while they were surrounded by people at work and at home, many of them craved meaningful contact with those who shared “past experiences.” The report elaborated: “what the resettlers wanted was meaningful associations with other resettlers, not with Caucasians.” The resettlers’ unique wartime experiences left them craving the companionship of fellow Japanese-Americans. The report, in light of the difficulties in securing adequate housing and well-paying jobs as well as the Nisei’s general dislike of Chicago, concluded that the Nisei had yet to make Chicago their home, as they were so used to “the clean air and sunshine of California,” where many of them originated from. It also noted that many resettlers came to look at relocation centers as home, since their social lives were grounded in the friendships made with other Japanese-Americans there.¹³

Another report, *Adjustment Problems of Chicago Resettlers* (1944), by journalist Togo Tanaka, addressed the social isolation felt by most Japanese-Americans, especially young unmarried Nisei. He wrote that young Nisei arriving in a city they barely knew, stripped of their tight-knit social networks, felt their situation be “intolerable.” A young, single, recently relocated Japanese-American who could not mingle with fellow Japanese-Americans, Tanaka noted, was “hungry for the kind of companionship and social affair so far from the scene,” and any issues of

¹² Ibid, 61-62 (“impersonal,” “see beyond,” “a hurry,” “back home,” “they speak”).

¹³ Ibid, 75 (“clean air”), 155 (“past experiences,” “meaningful associations”).

“integration vs. segregation” that the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) and other agencies were concerned with were inconsequential. Organizing and attending Japanese-American social functions relieved Nisei, especially young Nisei, of their loneliness, for any would “jump at a chance to enjoy the evening at the ‘All-Nisei Dance of the American Nisei Athletic Club, midland hotel.’”¹⁴

Thus many Nisei started to organize and attend all-Nisei dances, which became occurred regularly by 1944. There were some mixed dances in which both Nisei and whites participated, but as one interviewee in *The First Year of Resettlement in Chicago* noticed, “the Nisei seemed to stick very much to themselves and seemed to be occupied primarily in seeking out old friends whom they had not seen for some time.”¹⁵ Together, the Nisei reminisced about life in the internment camps, sought out old friends and made new ones, talked about the parts of Chicago life that they did not like. The report praised these dances despite their segregated nature, insisting that these dances were “significant” because they were venues in which resettlers could gather and “communicate their discontents and feelings to one another.”¹⁶

Tanaka mentioned people who profited off of this sentiment, people who saw that these dances satisfied a particular emotional need. He interviewed two Japanese-American event promoters who said that Nisei dances were profitable because Nisei *wanted* to go to them, unlike whites who did not want to socialize with Japanese-Americans at mixed dances. One said “the Nisei want their own dances; if they didn’t, they wouldn’t be coming to mine.”¹⁷ Japanese-Americans also avoided integrated dances out of a fear of racial conflict. As one event promoter said, “right away you’d have young bloods taking sides according to their race. Too much trouble. You’d have a real race riot.”¹⁸ The idea of smooth integration was all imagined; in reality, it was difficult for the Nisei to even mingle with white Americans. Thus Nisei less frequently attended dances organized by the YMCA than all-Nisei ones.

¹⁴ Tanaka, *Adjustment Problems*, 61 (“intolerable”), 64 (“hungry,” “jump”).

¹⁵ Shibutani, *The First Year of the Resettlement*, 168.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 179.

¹⁷ Tanaka, *Adjustment Problems*, 69.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Interestingly, these reports do not mention any forms of extreme delinquency and crime as described in the 1947 Chicago Resettlers Committee analyzed by Wu; in fact, closer readings of the reports show that Japanese-Americans did not give these “delinquents” much attention, which suggests that perhaps the CRC’s analysis of delinquency was exaggerated. *The First Year of Resettlement in Chicago* noted a prevalence of gambling among the resettlers, but suggested that these games were “played for fun at low stakes.”¹⁹ In fact, the writer offered a social explanation to the presence of gambling in the resettler community: poker had always been a pastime in pre-war communities and was a way to “alleviate the boresome humdrum routine of camp life.”²⁰

When gang fights did happen, most people did not pay them much attention. Shibutani’s report noted one notable gang fight which took place at the all-Nisei dance at the Midland Hotel, which Tanaka also wrote about in his report. There was “little ill-feeling directed against those that had been involved,” and that “by and large most Nisei either did not care or thought the whole incident quite amusing.” The report later quoted one Nisei who said, “I don’t think that zoot suits hurt the Nisei so much. Some of them are O.K. These extreme guys are comical, but some of these guys look sharp in semi-zoot suits.” Such a view provided a stark contrast to the urgency with which the CRC felt the need to address the problem of delinquency. In fact, these gangs made sure to keep their wild parties in towns away from Chicago “to keep everything acceptable in the eyes of the community.” There were hardly any Nisei prostitutes, and “street-walking by Nisei girls and ‘pick-up’ dates were almost unheard of.”²¹ One can conclude that they made a conscious effort to keep hidden and to decrease awareness of their so-called “delinquent” activities.

Given that the delinquency did not constitute a considerable problem within the Japanese-American community, it could be argued that the CRC’s activities, though targeted at so-called delinquents, were actually designed to help the *entire* Japanese-American community. While the CRC’s ultimate goal may have been to integrate Japanese-Americans into greater citizens of America, further reports written by the City-Wide Recreation Council of the CRC suggest that their bigger concerns were to

¹⁹ Shibutani, *The First Year of the Resettlement*, 149.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 150.

²¹ *Ibid*, 150 (“ill-feeling”), 220 (“zoot suits hurt,” “acceptable,” “street-waking”).

first quell the pervasive feelings of isolation and restlessness by developing their civic identity to Chicago, for they understood that many were opposed to integration efforts into the larger white community.

Shibutani noted in his report that top-down integration efforts by white organizations and the JACL were met with a lack of interest and even resentment. Shibutani writes that JACL blamed Nisei for their “lack of assimilation” that had led to their confinement, and as a result “the Nisei have learned to pay lip service to the theory that they ought to go out to ‘integrate’ themselves into the Caucasian community.”²² Many of them paid no attention to nor were interested in integrating into white society; some were even resentful of Japanese-Americans who were cooperating with white organizations, for they were “hardly said to be the real leaders of the Nisei, for many of them were extremely unpopular or thoroughly disliked by others.”²³

Setsuko Matsunaga Nishi argues in her dissertation that the JACL aroused a general sense of resentment among Nisei towards integration efforts. Anti-JACL resentment was rooted in the fact that the organization had aided, rather than protested, the internment of Japanese-Americans. Jim Shikami, who evacuated to Manzanar at age ten, recalls the Manzanar Riot in December 1942—Harry Ueno, after finding out that the Manzanar camp staff was stealing rationed sugar and meat and selling them on the black market, beat Fred Tayama, a JACL leader, whom Ueno believed was conspiring with the camp administration.²⁴ More than 4,000 detainees came to protest Ueno’s arrest; two were fatally shot. Nishi wrote that distrust of the old leadership of the JACL was so strong that “it is doubtful if the organization can ever again flourish as it did before evacuation.”²⁵

Thus, the CRC organized its structure and its activities in such a way to accurately represent the needs of the larger Japanese-American community. It did not encourage integration but rather a development of civic identity to Chicago in order to quell the general feelings of restlessness and isolation that Japanese-Americans associated with the city. Nishi noted several changes between 1944 and 1947: the withdrawal

²² Ibid, 232.

²³ Ibid, 254.

²⁴ Jim Shikami, interview by author, May 6, 2015.

²⁵ Setsuko Matsunaga Nishi, “Japanese American Achievement in Chicago: A Cultural Response to Degradation” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1963), 276, 281.

of white-sponsored resettlement activities and the arrival of the Issei, the Nisei's parents.²⁶ White groups saw that their attempts at encouraging assimilation through the organization of racially inclusive activities were fruitless. Most importantly, the arrival of the Issei allowed the CRC to organize formally—the Nisei believed that Issei participation in the organization was indispensable, as the memory of the JACL violating the interests of the people they were claiming to protect was still vivid within the community. By the fall of 1945, the CRC's executive board comprised of Issei, Nisei, religious leaders, pre-war residents, and representatives of the WRA.²⁷ This board aimed to fully serve the interests of the entire Japanese-American population living in Chicago.

The CRC quickly gathered all existing sports clubs under the umbrella organization Chicago Nisei Athletic Association and provided support to Nisei social clubs, churches and civic clubs.²⁸ Furthermore, the CRC and the City-Wide Reaction Council did not impose their objectives of assimilation onto Nisei; rather, they acted as a mediator for Nisei groups to use resources in the Greater Chicago area and develop a civic identity. Just a close look at the action verbs used in the objectives outlined by Hagiwara indicates the intermediary role adopted by the CRC: "*assist* organizations," "*encourage* teen-age groups," "*refer* special interest groups," "*guide* recreation committees."²⁹ By 1949, sixty-nine Japanese-American groups used nineteen facilities all over Chicago, including the University of Chicago's Stag Field.³⁰ Any attempt to interfere more met with a cooled response. The City-Wide Recreation Council's 1949 report noted an attempt to mix with a non-Nisei group at a Japanese dinner, but that "Nisei representation at this meeting was poor."³¹

The CRC organized these recreational activities not merely to provide a sense of community to Japanese-Americans, but to help those involved develop a civic identity to Chicago in order to quell any ill sentiment towards an "impersonal" Chicago. Abe Hagiwara, the Recreational

²⁶ Ibid, 171.

²⁷ Ibid, 180.

²⁸ Jack Yatsutake, *Annual Report 1948* (Chicago, IL: Chicago Resettlers Committee, 1944), 7.

²⁹ Abe Hagiwara, *For the Greater Participation in Community* (Chicago, IL: Chicago Resettlers Committee, 1948), 5 (emphasis added).

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ City-Wide Recreation Council, *A Report of the City-Wide Recreation Council* (Chicago, IL: Chicago Resettlers Committee, 1949), 4.

Director of the Chicago Resettlers Committee, stressed the importance of referring Nisei groups to local facilities and agencies. He wrote that in order to produce new leaders with “civic interest and responsibility,” it was necessary to expose Nisei and their recreational groups to facilities that would help them.³² The Committee started at the neighborhood level—it divided into the Westside, Northside and Southside Recreation Committees to seek out local agencies and facilities within their respective neighborhoods to get participants to identify first with their immediate neighborhoods. Hagiwara wanted Japanese-Americans to know that Chicago had numerous facilities open and available for their use in order to relieve them of the feeling that Chicago was unwelcoming and impersonal.

One of the biggest recreational organizations that served Chicago’s Japanese-American community was the Chicago Nisei Athletic Association (CNAA), organized in 1946 by Tom Teraji. The CNAA consisted of basketball, baseball, bowling and other sports teams, including the Broncos, the Huskies, and the Zephers. The CRC assisted the CNAA by arranging late-night practice for the Nisei teams at the Olivet Institute. Mary Shimomura joined the Girls’ Basketball Club growing up and recalled that “we were pretty terrible.”³³ Records of the day-to-day activities of these groups are limited except for photos and oral history interviews left behind. Ben Chikaraishi recalls that the CNAA, once it reached twelve hundred people, started to use other facilities, like the Chute Junior High School and Haven Middle School gyms in Evanston.

Participation in sports allowed players to develop an affinity for and personal identification with Chicago, since many of them competed against other Japanese-American teams from other cities. Scholars have studied the relationship between sports teams and civic identity, especially of players who at first felt marginalized from their city. Richard Pierce, for example, writes about African-Americans in Indianapolis during the early 1950s who played interscholastic basketball that “intertwined them with the larger Indiana community in a manner that

³² Hagiwara, *For the Greater Participation in Community*, 3.

³³ Mary Shimomura, interview by author, April 27, 2015.

transcended mere residency.”³⁴ He goes on to mention that they also took to the streets, gathering at jazz clubs on Indiana Avenue or playing pick-up games at the basketball court in the Lockefield Gardens housing project.³⁵ Participating in these activities allowed inner-city youth to develop a civic identity to Indianapolis and become a part of its urban fabric.

The CRC's desire to see Japanese-Americans “become participating members of the Chicago citizenry” echoes the way inner-city kids in Indianapolis became intertwined with the larger Indianapolis community, in that Nisei youth also developed an attachment to their home city larger and more complicated than their residency status.³⁶ The CNAA teams were not merely recreational; they participated in tournaments against other Japanese-American sports teams in the Midwest and made news in the *Chicago Tribune*, beating many of their Midwest and Pacific counterparts. The Chicago Huskies were five-time consecutive winners of the Nisei Invitational Tournament held in Olivet Institute every year—beating teams from Cleveland, Detroit, Minneapolis, Toronto, Berkeley and Honolulu.³⁷ They were not just the Huskies, but the *Chicago* Huskies. By representing their city at competitions against similar teams from different cities, they developed a Chicago-conscious identity.

Alone and isolated in Chicago, young Nisei sought comfort in the closeness of the Japanese-American community and in the process set the terms of their relation to and identification with the city around them. The mainstream Asian-American narrative has stressed assimilation into white society, but it is in fact a much more complex story. Japanese-Americans in immediate postwar Chicago at first actively rejected federally mandated calls for integration and developed first and foremost a civic identity. This civic identity has allowed the Japanese-American community in Chicago to be one of most tightly knit in the entire country. Many of the Nisei who settled in Chicago stayed there to raise families, many of whom are still living in the Chicagoland area. Their successors, the Sansei, took their love of Chicago even further; they developed a

³⁴ Richard B. Pierce, *Polite Protest: The Political Economy of Race in Indianapolis, 1920-1970* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 13.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Social Analysis Committee, *Chicago Settlement: A 1947 Report* (Chicago, IL: Chicago Resettlers Committee, 1947), 4.

³⁷ “Huskies Keep Nisei Basket Title 5th Year,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, April 16, 1951.

cultural appreciation for Chicago through their love of Michigan Avenue or the Chicago Blackhawks, even turning down job offers in Los Angeles and New York to stay in Chicago. Though less active, the Sansei Yonsei Athletic Association, the successor of the CNAA, now holds weekly basketball clinics in Ravenswood on Saturdays for all levels. Although recreational activities in the Japanese-American community are no longer as prevalent as they were before, they are a reminder of the collective resistance to integration and an effort to become a part of the urban fabric that is Chicago.

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“What Have We Left Behind?”

Education, History, and Identity in the Wake of Apartheid

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I. RECLAIMING A LANGUAGE, REDRESSING A SCHOLARSHIP

In 1996, Glynn Alard won runner-up in the Western Cape Afrikaans Debate Tournament for high school students. In his speech, Alard, a young coloured man, argued in support of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).¹ The TRC was a restorative justice body that held public hearings of victims of human rights abuses under the apartheid government. Alard’s pro-TRC position reflected and informed his own growing political consciousness as a coloured youth in post-apartheid South Africa. To debate in his family’s dialect of Cape Afrikaans about a contemporary political event, especially one that centered on racial oppression and remembrance, provided Alard with an opportunity to grapple with transformations in South African political culture and enact changes in his self-definition:

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¹ In the South African context, the use of ‘coloured’ as a racial designation has a particularized history and meaning, different than the use of either ‘of color’ or ‘colored’ in the American context. I draw on the work of Zimitri Erasmus to define ‘coloured’ as “a highly specific and instantly recognizable cultural formation—not just ‘a mixture’ but a very particular ‘mixture’ comprising elements of Dutch, British, Malaysian, Khoi, and other forms of African culture appropriated, translated in complex and subtle ways.” Zimitri Erasmus, “Introduction: Re-imagining Coloured Identities in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” in *Coloured by History, Shaped by Place*, ed. Zimitri Erasmus (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2001), 21.

[Afrikaans debating] wasn't just an academic exercise. The language made it personal because English is a global language. Afrikaans is a deeply South African, a deeply Cape language. With the whitewashing of language during apartheid, I wanted to take it back. I wanted to say it's not just the language of the apartheid government because before apartheid started my, great grandmothers...were speaking this language.²

While learning that Afrikaans never exclusively belonged to white Afrikaners of Dutch heritage, but was in fact originally a language that coalesced in the slave quarters of the Cape Colony during the eighteenth century, Alard reexamined fundamental ideas and identities his parents and grandparents took for granted.³ The chance to debate with white Afrikaner students in the language of Afrikaans empowered Alard to reclaim the language his family spoke and to rethink what it meant to be coloured in the New South Africa. Alard's experience with Afrikaans debate was unique; many coloureds during and immediately after apartheid shied away from using Cape Afrikaans publicly. Race relations historian Mohamed Adhikari writes of a casual conversation with another middle-class coloured informant "that although *kombuis* [kitchen, or Cape] Afrikaans was his home language, he felt ashamed of using it when speaking to whites or 'respectable people,' as it would mark him as 'low class.'"⁴ How did Alard come to learn and celebrate the deeper past of Cape Afrikaans?

The opportunity came with the secondary education Alard received. Alard matriculated from The Settlers High School (TSHS), an English-language medium school founded for white students in 1965 that accepted non-white students beginning in 1991. In the wake of apartheid policies and mentalities, TSHS provided coloured students with a space to explore their histories, identities, and politics. Language functioned as one axis along which new directions for self-exploration and self-definition grew. Most coloured students attending TSHS in the 1990s spoke *kombuis* Afrikaans at home, whereas most whites at the school were of British heritage and spoke English with their families. Seeing coloured students like himself excel in Afrikaans classes and activities, particularly in

² Glynn Alard (former student), interview by author, January 14, 2016, Cape Town.

³ Christopher S. Wren, "Blacks Shaped Language of Apartheid, Linguists Say," *New York Times*, May 16, 1989.

⁴ Mohamed Adhikari, *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South African Coloured Community* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005), 16, 195n55.

relation to their white peers, Alard began to interrogate the origins of Afrikaans. While many English language schools in Cape Town did not include Afrikaans instruction in their curricula, TSHS offered Afrikaans due to its location in a largely Afrikaner suburb. TSHS maintaining an Anglicized ethos but incorporating Afrikaans language classes demonstrates the multiplicity of opportunities available at the school, which encouraged students to position themselves within a matrix of identifications (e.g., linguistic, socioeconomic, religious, academic). As section three illustrates, coloured students responded variably to Afrikaans language instruction. The range of their experiences suggests that, as the first generation of post-apartheid students negotiated integration, they contended with what it meant to be coloured, to assimilate, and to stand out. Post-apartheid education comprised a vital space and time of race-making, even as South Africa was putatively a ‘rainbow nation.’

By focusing on transformations at one school throughout the 1990s, this article reexamines conventional understandings of coloured identity during the transition to post-apartheid South Africa. Perhaps the most well-known narrative about coloured identity is Adhikari’s *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough* (2005). Adhikari argues that the ‘coloured’ racial category surfaced in the late nineteenth century with the advent of large-scale mining in the Cape region and remained uniform with sharply bounded fluidity throughout apartheid. According to Adhikari, four features stabilized the monolith of coloured identity: coloureds’ intermediate status in South Africa’s racial hierarchy, desire to assimilate into dominant society, acquisition of derogatory stereotypes, and experience of marginality. In his conclusion, he argues that the end of apartheid destabilized ‘colouredness’ by dismantling these features.⁵ While this article by no means suggests that the apartheid regime had an insignificant impact on coloured consciousness and identity expression, it does claim that Adhikari’s framework—which relies on apartheid’s parameters on subaltern mobility and mobilization in his appraisal of a consistent coloured identity—risks reinscribing the logic and discourse of repression in narratives of colouredness.

⁵ Ibid., 1-32, 162-88.

In contrast, by viewing these features as generalizations and historicizing the dynamics of race-making at the level of schooling and socialization, this article claims that apartheid's end made visible processes of experimentation and rupture with respect to coloured identity. Examining the realm of integrated education encourages us to conceive of changes in coloured identity in the 1990s as a manifestation and reordering of a matrix of identifications—not, as Adhikari supposes, a linear, relatively fixed transition from stability to disruption. Whereas the apartheid state manufactured a logic of race that dictated this matrix, integration rendered race enmeshed in this matrix, entangled with other self-identifications. The analysis in this article throws into relief Cape Town social historian Shamil Jeppie's understanding of race and ethnicity in identity: "An ethnic term or marker of ethnic self-identification...should be seen as one among a number of identities which an individual can or will articulate depending on the circumstances."⁶ TSHS provided novel avenues of self-understanding and expression for people with alternative ideas about politics, society, and themselves. Consequently, coloured identity manifested as a function of coloured choices rather than as the classification or prescription of a white government.

When TSHS integrated in 1991 before apartheid's end, it became one of the first schools in the Western Cape to challenge hierarchical conceptions of race, subverting long-term relationships between center and periphery and providing opportunities for the debunking and transcendence of stereotypes. In a short time period, many coloured students enrolled at TSHS. Another critical moment of transformation occurred by 2000, as the student body became more coloured than white. In effect, the school's historically 'white' identity, or *habitus*, was supplanted by a 'coloured' *habitus*.⁷ In other words, the shift to a coloured student body precipitated differentiation in coloured identity. Although divergences in coloured self-definition long agitated racial politics in Cape Town, the swift and

⁶ Shamil Jeppie, "Re-classifications: Coloured, Malay, Muslim," in *Coloured by History, Shaped by Place*, 82.

⁷ I draw from the work of Pierre Bourdieu to understand *habitus* as the individual and collective internalization of external social structures, which then reproduces and manifests these structures in everyday dispositions and behaviors. Pierre Bourdieu, "Structures, *Habitus*, Practices," in *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

pronounced demographic changes at TSHS rendered explicit and unmistakable this process of heterogeneity. Throughout, this article suggests that the school's location, and relatedly its middle- and upper-middle class demographic, played key roles in facilitating these new forms of self- and race-making. The geographic and class-related characteristics of TSHS allowed for youth experimentation both with *and* against the flexible, but particularized, *habitus* embodied by the school. This *habitus* emanated from the school's history as a whites-only school that benefited in resources and image from apartheid's racial hierarchy, but one that was also consciously unaligned with the visions and ideals of the Afrikaner Nationalist government. Accordingly, the school comprised a semi-alternative regime during its decade of integration.

Identity forms dialectically, through individual decision-making circumscribed by sociohistorical conditions, at the interstices of internal and external understandings of self. The presence of coloureds and white students at TSHS during this decade was instrumental to the visibility and expansion of distinctions in colouredness *and* whiteness. White student Fernandez summarized that white students “learned not only to acknowledge differences, but to embrace differences.”⁸ Coloured students at TSHS were part of a larger trend of coloured South Africans who “undermined, even invalidated, some of the most basic assumptions and practices at the foundation of coloured identity from the time it crystallized.”⁹ Coloured students were also critical in the invalidation of such aspects of white identity. Considering that ‘whiteness’ is to some extent constituted by ignorance of racial difference, the presence and choices of coloured students necessarily transformed the way white students related to and understood their own backgrounds as well as those of students of color.¹⁰ After participating in a family tree activity, Fernandez “realized that whites are as much if not more a ‘mixed breed,’” acknowledging his Dutch, English, German, and Portuguese roots.¹¹

In view of the dialectical relationship between schooling and youth identity, and between ‘white’ and ‘coloured’ self-understandings, this

⁸ Ryan Fernandez (former student), interview by author, January 14, 2016, Cape Town.

⁹ Adhikari, *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough*, 175.

¹⁰ Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 112.

¹¹ Fernandez, interview.

article focuses on interactions between students and administration through the lens of shifting demographics, sociocultural aspects of schooling, and heritage commemoration. Specifically, TSHS's emphasis on income in its admissions; use of English as the medium of instruction but its inclusion of Afrikaans classes; location at the intersection of a 'white' residential area and 'coloured' area; and extracurricular opportunities and administrative policies coalesced to cultivate newly intersectional conceptions of identity. Since these factors had an impact on coloured consciousness in varied ways, students' experiences speak to an immense variety of interpretations and articulations of colouredness. Accordingly, the dynamics of socialization and race-making at TSHS encapsulated larger contradictions and ambiguities of coloured identity in the transition to post-apartheid South Africa. Given that coloured youth's subjectivities could be plotted along manifold, moving axes, this article's understanding of the multiplicity of identities at TSHS dispenses with generalizations of the 'coloured,' 'African,' and 'European' experience throughout South African history—the very generalizations that ground Adhikari's narrative and argumentation about changes (or lack thereof) in coloured identity.

How did the first coloured TSHS students negotiate between their backgrounds and the 'white' norms and *habitus* of the school? How did the white students view their new peers? Describing the challenges of integration, education scholar Rakgadi Phatlane writes that apartheid "limited access to knowledge about the 'other'" because South Africans lacked day-to-day interactions with those of different racial identities. This separation produced "ignorance about the way different racial groups lived, which in turn provided a fertile climate for the creation of myths and sometimes inaccurate perceptions...about one another."¹² Integration marked the first time white and coloured youth had to question their self-identities and refashion themselves in relation to the racial categories of apartheid. Because segregation was a totalizing phenomenon, in which race absorbed other categories of identification, the policing and probing of racial identity became visible only during

¹² Rakgadi Phatlane, "Experiencing Diversity in a South African School," in *Thinking Diversity, Building Cohesion: A Transnational Dialogue on Education*, ed. Mokubung Nkomo and Saloshna Vandeyar (Pretoria, South Africa: Unisa Press, 2009), 94.

integration. Paradoxically, ‘race’ became more pronounced, and more malleable, with the rise of a ‘rainbow nation.’ Straddling the line between Old and New South Africa, the first generation of coloured students encountered new chances for self-representation and ethnic mobilization.

Likewise, the white administration wrestled with the school’s collective identity as it opened its doors to non-white students. In the early 2000s, after the student body became majority coloured, a series of ceremonies acknowledged the demographic changes and honored the heritage of students of color. One ceremony involved the recognition of the Cochoqua, a subgroup of the indigenous Khoikhoi who inhabited the land on which TSHS was built. Former headmaster Webster explained the commemoration of the Cochoqua as a “major turning point” in the school’s history, which illustrated “that our school was rooted in the past; that it had both settler and indigenous heritage.”¹³ In one TSHS history book, the school celebrated its student body’s multiethnic identity by framing Cochoqua commemoration as a “pioneering act and a major identification of the school with its indigenous population.”¹⁴ If the school history books portray the administration’s view of integration, this article examines the construction of social identity and historical consciousness as the fluid, dialogic interplay between student and staff. As curriculum theorists and critical race scholars Michael Apple and Kristen Buras explain, “Both dominant and subaltern collectivities seek to influence the production and circulation of knowledge and reinterpret the representations that permeate everyday school life.”¹⁵ The actions of the first generation of coloured students changed TSHS just as TSHS changed them.

While coloured students may neither seek nor find a uniform narrative that unites them through a shared past, they have demonstrated interest in learning more about the impacts of their ancestry on South African

¹³ Trevor Webster (former headmaster), interview by author, January 13, 2016, Cape Town.

¹⁴ Paul Haupt. *The Settlers: Forty Years Towards Freedom; A History of the Settlers High School* (Cape Town: The Settlers High School, 2005), 95.

¹⁵ Kristen L. Buras and Michael W. Apple, “The Subaltern Speak: Curriculum, Power, and Educational Struggles,” introduction to *The Subaltern Speak: Curriculum, Power, and Educational Struggles*, ed. Michael W. Apple and Kristen L. Buras (New York: Routledge, 2006), 27.

society.¹⁶ The intrinsic complexity and uncertainty behind questions of coloured history and identity invoke memory studies scholar Sean Field's "fragile identity." Describing implications of hybridity, he writes that coloureds' "responses to their identity location, and interpretations of their feelings, need not be static or fixed. The admitting of mistakes, confusion, and weakness allows for the recognition of a fragile identity in the process of perpetual making and becoming."¹⁷ Oral history interviews with former TSHS students represent reflections on a decade that has passed yet remains at the forefront of Cape Town's political and cultural psyche. Questions about the impact of apartheid and its demise on coloured subjectivities persist today with nearly the same urgency and lack of closure as in the 1990s.

As Glynn Alard undertook this process of interrogating, defining, and redefining coloured identity, he asked himself: "What have we left behind?"¹⁸ Underlying this question was the inherent fragility Field described—an instability that evokes the uncertainty which drives the enduring search for the nature of coloured identity. Rather than view coloured identity (or any racial identity) before the end of apartheid as fixed or closed, this article illuminates how individual choices have interacted continuously with sociohistorical circumstances and political systems to produce a flexible subaltern subjectivity. This article therefore argues that what students left behind in the years TSHS integrated was the logic of race manufactured by apartheid as well as the tools this logic stipulated for self-definition. In a desegregated space, students had to think proactively about the role of race and how to position themselves within a matrix of identifications.¹⁹

The use of oral histories to analyze schooling's role in informing and transforming coloured subjectivities suggests that it would be reductive to distill monolithic narratives and static conceptions of coloured history and identity. The article's subjects, despite their similar educational and

¹⁶ Crain Soudien, "Apartheid's Children: Student Narratives of the Relationship between Experiences in School and Perceptions of Racial Identity in South Africa" (PhD diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1996), 328.

¹⁷ Sean Field, "Fragile Identities: Memory, Emotion and Coloured Residents of Windermere," in *Oral History, Community, and Displacement: Imagining Memories in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 40.

¹⁸ Alard, interview.

¹⁹ On the logic of race, see Crain Soudien *Realising the Dream: Unlearning the Logic of Race in the South African School* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2012).

socioeconomic backgrounds, represent different streams of colouredness and contribute to the multiplicity of coloured pasts and self-understandings. One cost of relying on oral histories lies in not necessarily being able to confirm the exact time, place, and manner in which certain events occurred. However, this sense of imprecision adds texture to the shape of the institutional and personal transformations at TSHS and, in so doing, reflects their non-linear chronology and abundance of possible meanings. By foregrounding oral histories, moreover, this article redresses the lack of representation of coloured experiences in South African historiography. Most survey histories write coloureds out of the narrative or sideline colouredness to passing comments. Only a handful of works on colouredness have been written by coloured people. While I am not a coloured South African but a white American, my centering of coloured experiences and perspectives indicates the exigency of honoring subjectivities in writing social history.²⁰ Firsthand experiences, gender historian Joan Scott writes, “can confirm what we know and upset what has been taken for granted (when different meanings are in conflict we readjust our vision to take account of the conflict or to resolve it...).”²¹ Coloured subjects’ accounts reframe the question of coloured identity in the wake of apartheid in terms of both continuity and change. Coloured youth have long had opportunities for self-definition, but TSHS students worked within a new set of circumstances and possibilities.

II. HISTORICIZING TRANSFORMATIONS IN COLOURED IDENTITY

While coloureds comprised about one-tenth of the South African population at apartheid’s end, they constituted over one half of the Western Cape population.²² The experiences of Cape Town coloureds

²⁰ As Kurt Haupt of the Class of 1994 reminded me, the time most South Africans seek out and listen to coloured opinions is during election season. Because coloureds have never made up more than ten percent of the South African population, their political views and mobilizations have *ostensibly* mattered to other demographics only as a swing vote. Kurt Haupt, interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Cape Town.

²¹ Joan W. Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” *Critical Inquiry* 17, no. 4 (Summer 1991): 773.

²² Krisztina Tihanyi, *Blending in the Rainbow Nation: The Racial Integration of Schools and Its Implication for Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 16.

during apartheid illustrated the pressures and powers of occupying an interstitial status in South Africa's racial hierarchy. Colouredness encompassed a paradox whereby those classified as 'coloured' felt the burden of non-whiteness despite benefiting from material privileges that black Africans did not have. For most of the twentieth century, coloureds of Cape Town maintained parity with whites, with black Africans in the disenfranchised minority. In contrast to the 'native' category, first used to describe black Africans during the early twentieth century, coloureds during much of the twentieth century enjoyed privileges such as voting rights, participation in official political organizations, and relative mobility.²³ The comparative privilege of Cape Town coloureds explains, in part, why some coloureds could gain entrance into TSHS, and why the coloured (and white) students who attended were in an advantaged position to question their identities.

Despite their near parity with whites, coloureds remained conscious of racial differences during and after apartheid. Recounting how she was held back from swimming in the ocean by her grandparents at age five (swimming there was off-limits to non-whites), coloured alumna Du Plooy's demonstrated that coloured youth were aware that colouredness existed in a space outside TSHS's semi-alternative regime. Consciousness of racial difference from the final years of apartheid rendered the first coloured students at TSHS unique; they did not leave behind, but instead carried, a keen awareness of race as they entered TSHS. Along with other categories of identification, race became subject to inquiry and experimentation when coloured youth deconstructed and discarded apartheid's 'logic of race.' This section summarizes how identity differentiation among coloureds in Cape Town began during apartheid but was obscured by racialization. Integrated education at TSHS exposed and expedited interrelated processes of race-making and identity-shaping along intersectional lines. Although social, cultural, and economic factors shaped race-making during apartheid, white officials—not coloureds themselves—determined how to apply such factors to the reading of race. By contrast, coloured identity in the 1990s manifested as a function of coloured choices.

²³ The passing of the Native Reserve Location Act in 1902, for example, propelled the racial segregation of Africans resident in Cape Town. Under this Act, land was designated to Africans in places outside areas of white settlement.

The South African government accelerated the pace by which it codified differences between racial groups at midcentury, beginning with the Natives Representation Act of 1936. This legislation specified attributes of racial categories, as well as standards for racial mobility, instantiating race-based hierarchy and race-class associations. The Population Registration Act of 1950 required South Africans to register according to race and established an Office for Racial Classification in order to supervise this process. Sociologist Deborah Posel demonstrates how social, cultural, and economic factors that distinguished coloureds from whites and blacks prompted reclassification. For example, appeal boards called on barbers to testify to a person's hair texture, using the infamous pencil test to assess straightness (i.e. 'whiteness'). However, that race could not be determined with precision proved “no barrier to the elimination of ambiguity and mobility in the practice of racial classification.”²⁴ Ironically, the artificiality and flexibility of racial categories strengthened their efficacy as instruments of identity prescription. The terms of the act did not require rigorous evidence, affording judicial authority to the social prejudice of white officials. One clause explained that a person's “habits, education and speech, deportment and demeanour in general shall be taken into account.”²⁵ The malleability of racial categories bore implications for coloureds who participated in integrated education, as their youthful creativity and subversion tested the singularity and objectivity of race.

If we examine coloured identities as “productive subjective realities shaped and reshaped by people under the conditions given them by history,” it becomes too simplistic to view colouredness as fundamentally consistent during apartheid.²⁶ Yet, Adhikari's study asserts that coloureds' intermediary status facilitated the stability of coloured identity from the late 1800s to 1994. He paints an abbreviated history to argue that colouredness emerged and remained at the intersection of competing interests; whites employed racial stratification to exert dominance, while those of mixed race drew on this system to acquire power in relation to

²⁴ Deborah Posel, “What's in a Name? Racial Categorisations Under Apartheid and Their Afterlife,” *Transformation* no. 47 (2001): 62-65.

²⁵ Republic of South Africa, Population Registration Act, no. 30 of 1950, section I(2), quoted in *ibid.*

²⁶ Erasmus, “Introduction: Re-imagining Coloured Identities,” 23.

their African social and economic rivals. Bypassing the history of miscegenation that led to the emergence of mixed race communities like the 'Bastards' and 'Griqua' in the 1700s, Adhikari argues that any changes in coloured identity until the 1990s did not alter its function as an intermediary that fostered assimilationism and marginality.²⁷ According to Adhikari, coloureds embraced and employed their racial distinctiveness predominantly to maintain their status in racial hierarchy.

For example, Adhikari discusses the writings of Alex La Guma, a coloured novelist and political activist, to contend that the racial system of apartheid undergirded coloured political agendas in the 1950s. To Adhikari, the advent of non-racist radicalism as expressed in La Guma's work had only a "superficial" influence on coloured identity. La Guma, he writes, contributed to a "tiny intelligentsia" that "operated within the conventional boundaries of the South African racial system."²⁸ Adhikari's focus on the racialized undertones of coloured writing in the 1940s and 1950s overlooks how these texts constituted new efforts to understand and express coloured politics and positionalities. While coloured elite used racialized language, they did so to articulate the political unity of all black South Africans. La Guma worked to destabilize and undermine white supremacy in the novel *A Walk in the Night* (1962) by articulating linguistic and appearance-based distinctions between coloureds of District Six and other black South Africans.²⁹ By de-essentializing blackness, La Guma's writings cultivated ties between coloured and black South Africans as a way to challenge the white government. Advocating diversity within unity, La Guma aligned himself within a historical matrix of identifications that incorporated race/ethnicity *and* accounted for the choice to oppose or comply with apartheid. While Adhikari sees this paradox as "inconsistent" and "unconscious," the reconciliation of colouredism (racialism) with non-racism proved central to how coloureds contested and transformed prescribed self-understandings.³⁰ In short,

²⁷ For a succinct yet comprehensive account of this history of miscegenation, see Cheryl Hendricks, "'Ominous' Liaisons: Tracing the Interface between 'Race' and 'Sex' at the Cape," in *Coloured by History, Shaped by Place*, 29-45.

²⁸ Adhikari, *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough*, 130.

²⁹ See Alex La Guma, *A Walk in the Night* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Mbari, 1962). In February 1966, the Nationalist government declared District Six a whites-only area through the Group Areas Act. Removals started in 1968, and by 1982, over 60,000 black people had been relocated to the Cape Flats township over 25 kilometers away.

³⁰ Adhikari, *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough*, 111.

Adhikari's analysis reproduces an identity matrix in which race was all-or-nothing, rather than intersecting with other categories of self-identification.

In the 1950s, efforts to promulgate colouredism alongside non-racism prefigured the construction of colouredness in the post-apartheid context. Alard described the paradox of post-apartheid coloured youth: “We have multiple heritage streams in our past and contemporary times, but they merged into something with unique emergent properties.”³¹ The persistence of ‘coloured’ as a discrete category alongside its legal, historical, and cultural unraveling raises questions about the extent to which identity is intrinsically embraced and extrinsically ascribed. Its endurance highlighted the continued utility of colouredness in South Africa and particularly Cape Town, where coloureds have made up the majority of the population and so have not necessarily been marginalized. Alongside the hope of a non-racial democracy, TSHS youth opted to hold onto, and simultaneously develop novel ideas about, coloured identity. While some coloureds espoused colorblindness, heritage commemoration at TSHS marked a turn toward embracing blackness. Implicit in this decision was the relevance of race to self-exploration and self-definition. In an integrated school, ‘blackness’ became more perceptible and malleable—subject to new interpretations and modifications. Rethinking ‘blackness,’ as well as ‘whiteness,’ was part and parcel of the way in which students reconceptualized and articulated colouredness. Accordingly, changes within coloured identity did not mean, as Adhikari suggests, “a rejection of the salience of racial identity or of colouredness in South African society and politics.”³² African National Congress leader Ebrahim Rassool suggested “coloureds are not so much racist as they fear non-racialism.”³³ After apartheid, coloured youth clung onto colouredness while grappling with and altering the nature of coloured identity. TSHS acted as a privileged, alternate regime of control that shed light on these transformations. Although the TSHS admissions committee acted blind to color, students and staff were themselves far from colorblind.

³¹ Alard, interview.

³² Adhikari, *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough*, 129.

³³ Ebrahim Rassool, “Unveiling the Heart of Fear.” *Now That We Are Free: Coloured Communities in a Democratic South Africa*, ed. Wilmot James, Daria Caliguire, and Kerry Cullinan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 57.

III. INTEGRATION AND FRACTURE AT THE SETTLERS HIGH SCHOOL

This section introduces the school's history in order to develop the context in which integration and identity differentiation occurred. The interrelated roles of geography, income, religion, and language in the manifestation and reordering of the identity matrix. TSHS was a semi-alternative regime; while the school benefited from the history of apartheid and in the 1990s represented a New South Africa, it proved exceptional in the pace and depth of its transformation. While TSHS's policies, culture, and demographics were thus unique within Cape Town's social and educational landscape, integration in general aided in a practice of post-apartheid race-making that exposed and reflected widespread possibilities for Cape Town coloureds.



Figure 1. Map of Cape Town with Railway Lines (Available at <http://www.capetown.gov.za>)

TSHS is located in the northern suburbs of Bellville, between Table Bay and Stellenbosch. The commercial node of Bellville connects predominantly white Afrikaner neighborhoods such as Welgemoed and Durbanville with coloured areas like Kuils River and Brackenfell. The Group Areas Act, which demarcated residential zones by racial differences, engineered these neighborhoods in the late 1950s. The Group Areas Board used railway lines to designate zones: areas north of the Bellville line and west of the Simonstown line were allocated for whites;

neighborhoods south of the Bellville line and east of the Simonstown line were assigned to blacks and coloureds respectively.³⁴ Consequently, coloured students came to TSHS from areas fifteen to twenty kilometers east of Bellville, but their parents drove through Bellville on their way to work in downtown. Bellville remains a largely white, upper-middle class, Afrikaans-speaking suburb twenty-five kilometers outside the urban center. Bellville is more conservative than the southern suburbs located closer downtown, where there are more English speakers and the school curricula have been more politicized. Education scholar Crain Soudien's dissertation “Apartheid's Children” discusses schools near the city center like Trafalgar High School where the faculty empowered students protest apartheid policies.³⁵

The academic program at TSHS in the 1990s was not politicized, as it did not promote racial consciousness. In the first years of integration, little was done on a curricular level to connect the history of slavery, dispossession, and marginality to the creation and maintenance of apartheid. TSHS was known instead for discipline, work ethic, and social mobility. This culture provided the limits within which students formulated and articulated their identities. In 1990 TSHS published its mission “to develop young people with self-discipline, independent thinking and a sound set of values, so that they will be able to realize their individual potential [and] enrich others in their future working and social environment.”³⁶ Accordingly, strict adherence to a kind of normative behavior that promised advancement persisted among a substantial subsection of coloureds at TSHS. As one student, Webster, recounted, TSHS included coloured families who sought the status that came with sending their children to a historically white school as well as coloured families who mobilized against apartheid governance and its vestiges.³⁷ Such tensions mapped themselves onto and, in the process, played out

³⁴ See “Cape Town the Segregated City,” *South African History Online*, last updated February 23, 2016, available at <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/cape-town-segregated-city>.

³⁵ Soudien, “Apartheid's Children.”

³⁶ “The Settlers Mission Statement,” *The Settlers High School Goals*, The Settlers High School archives, Bellville, Cape Town, South Africa (hereafter TSHS archives). The Settlers High School informally housed the collection of archival sources used in this article. The materials were kept at the school but not organized in systematized fashion, with no call numbers, folder/file numbers, or dates.

³⁷ Webster, interview.

across a matrix of school values. Precisely because TSHS—at least in the initial stages of integration—neither promoted coloured consciousness through academics nor suppressed awareness and articulation of racial identities, it represented a breeding ground for contestations over colouredness that occurred on a larger, more longstanding scale in the Western Cape.

Despite its academic detachment from racial discourse, TSHS aspired to include non-white students. On October 23, 1990, the governing body (mostly parents, but also staff and students) voted in favor of opening the school to non-whites immediately following the Clase Announcements. Named after Piet Clase, then minister of education, the announcements created three models for desegregating white-designated schools: Model A, a private school; Model B, a state school; and Model C, a school with semi-private, semi-state status. Although 98 percent of South African schools originally opted for Model B status, by 1992, as the Nationalist government's reign drew to a close, all formerly white schools were converted to Model C. The state defrayed teacher salaries, but the majority of expenses and decisions became the school community's task. The government claimed that this conversion was inevitable due to its inability to finance these schools. Education scholars Nazir Carrim and Crain Soudien contend that this setup, in which white parents and administrators established admission-related policies, for example, allowed Model C schools to avoid meaningful integration and promote a 'white' environment, in response to which non-white students had no choice but to acclimate.³⁸ While TSHS acquired Model C status in 1992, rather than conform to the assimilationist model endorsed by the state and absorbed by most white-designated schools, the school fostered an environment rich in choices about how to express racial and ethnic identity. Its focus on individual advancement paradoxically both sidelined and safeguarded racial and ethnic differences. The administration, for example, led informal discussions about racial diversity in preparation for integration without changing much on a curricular level.³⁹ Over time, white families fled to private schools, and

³⁸ Nazir Carrim and Crain Soudien, "Critical Antiracism in South Africa," *Critical Multiculturalism: Rethinking Multicultural and Antiracist Education*, ed. Stephen May (Abingdon, UK: RoutledgeFalmer, 1999), 160.

³⁹ One of the only additions was a family tree activity, which is discussed below.

within a decade of integration, TSHS had a student body 80 percent coloured.⁴⁰

By comparison, D.F. Malan High School, located less than three kilometers from TSHS, has remained an Afrikaans medium school and retained a majority white population. D.F. Malan maintained its Afrikaner ethos, as its environment—just as much as its high school fees—proved unwelcoming to non-white students. TSHS alumnus Lee Williams pointed out that nearly all the photos and paintings decorating the walls of a feeder middle school for D.F. Malan featured white people. TSHS, by contrast, did not emphasize whites in similar commemorative or symbolic gestures: “TSHS never really had strong traditions. There were no obstacles as far as school culture is concerned that isolated those coming from different backgrounds, which was cool. Whereas in an Afrikaans-speaking school there are such obvious obstacles. This makes you feel like a foreigner.”⁴¹ Many students agreed that TSHS’s Anglicized ethos made it unique for the northern suburbs. As many faculty and families were British or Anglicized Afrikaners, TSHS understood itself as ideologically distinct from the conservative Nationalist government, which linked the maintenance of white supremacy with the propagation of Afrikaner culture, rendering TSHS more progressive and open-minded than neighboring Afrikaner schools.

Ironically, Afrikaans classes at TSHS facilitated the school’s relative progressivism. Smidt-Booys questioned and embraced her colouredness in light of the Afrikaans instruction she received. She remembered how her Afrikaans teacher, Ms. Nell, “encouraged the natural Cape Afrikaans accents. Because she loved the accent so much, she made us embrace who we were.” In addition to the passion Ms. Nell conveyed for Cape Afrikaans, the literature she had students read and perform allowed them to engage with their own experiences of apartheid. For example, students acted coloured writer Adam Small’s *Kanna hy kê hystoe* (“Kanna comes home”). As Smidt-Booys described, *Kanna kê hystoe* follows a man who distances himself from his home in an impoverished township and succeeds. She said: “a lot of us tend to think that when we make something of ourselves, we have to remove ourselves from what we were, and

⁴⁰ “Enrolment by Race: TSHS,” TSHS archives.

⁴¹ Lee Williams (former student), interview by author, January 13, 2016, Cape Town.

[Kanna] kind of forgot where he came from.” For Smidt-Booys, Small’s Kanna invokes and indicts a subset of people who belonged to the coloured group during apartheid but whose relative success under white supremacy led them to forget or reject their different roots. For Smidt-Booys, works by Small and other coloureds about displacement and (im)mobility had personal resonance, as her family members endured forced removal from areas destroyed or sanctioned for whites, such as Sophiatown in Johannesburg (1955-63) and District Six in Cape Town (starting in 1968). Some partook in the Soweto Uprising of 1976. Like Alard, Smidt-Booys gained the voice and confidence in Afrikaans to articulate coloured identity and consciousness.⁴²

Of the first generation of coloured students, not all came from families welcoming of radical, racialized politics. Because TSHS maintained lofty school fees, many upper-middle class coloured families concerned with social mobility did not encourage changes in racial consciousness. Williams lamented the lack of identity awareness among his family, who attended a white church and did not often openly discuss their differences:

As a coloured South African, I don’t really have a strong sense of identity associating with other coloureds. I identify as South African firstly, but for my kids, I think I would like a bit more, because...I don’t want my kids to get swallowed up if they attend TSHS by becoming part of the majority of South Africans who just speak English.⁴³

Williams’s account complicates, but does not problematize, the perspective given by Alard and Smidt-Booys. In contrast to the burgeoning pride Alard and Smidt-Booys found in studying Afrikaans at TSHS, Williams conveyed how the cosmopolitanism of English has drowned out racial difference as well as student investment in understanding (let alone examining) the histories of such difference. In each of their narratives, language functioned as a site of reckoning not only the idea but the identity of colouredness—a means by which to accept, reject, or reimagine one’s racial distinctiveness. Altogether, the experiences of Alard, Smidt-Booys, and Williams emphasize the variable ways coloured youth drew on language to position themselves within a

⁴² Shelley Smidt-Booys (former student), interview by author, January 13, 2016, Cape Town.

⁴³ Williams, interview.

matrix of self-identifications that included, but was not controlled, by race. Paradoxically, contrasting experiences of colouredness underscore the category's persistence.

Students' self-definitions reveal how various axes within the matrix intersected in old and new ways. For example, Alard attended TSHS on a scholarship, whereas Williams's parents, successful businesspeople in the egg industry, financed his education themselves. Since the Williams family sent their children to TSHS to maintain and build on the socioeconomic mobility they achieved during apartheid, aspirations regarding class impacted his perceptions of language and race. However, wealth by no means translated into assimilation to 'white' norms; some of the school's most radical students came from privileged backgrounds. One student, daughter of a coloured politician, converted to Rastafarianism and campaigned for TSHS to allow her to observe her religion (e.g., change her dress and hair).⁴⁴ While section four probes this example to illuminate intersections and negotiations along the axis of gender, the success of this student demonstrated how TSHS operated as its own regime that afforded students bounded creativity to break down preexisting conventions and hierarchies. Wealthier students perhaps had less to lose, for example, while those who saw TSHS as a vehicle for advancement arguably had more to lose and less to challenge. Each student decided which battles to fight, and, in the process, stripped past norms and categories of their race-class associations. Over the 1990s, 'blackness' at TSHS became associated with mobility.

Central to this dynamic of diversification was the maintenance of high fees. In 1991, the first year of integration, the cost of attending TSHS was over R1 000 pa.⁴⁵ The average white South African then earned about R51 000, the average black African R6 000, and the average coloured R11 000.⁴⁶ Capetonians made more than this average, but it is clear that the average African or coloured family would have needed to spend a high percentage of their income on TSHS tuition. In 1997, when the Department of

⁴⁴ Gaenor Camp Botha (former student), interview by author, January 14, 2016, Cape Town.

⁴⁵ Richard Daly Papers, TSHS archives.

⁴⁶ Servaas van der Berg and Megan Louw, "Changing Patterns of South African Income Distribution: Towards Time Series Estimates of Distribution and Property" (conference paper, Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa, Stellenbosch, South Africa, September 17-19, 2003).

Education placed a ceiling on school fees, TSHS responded by indicating its reliance on parent funding to preserve its programs and culture of individual attention and opportunity: "This school objects to limiting school fees to 1/30 of their annual net income. Why have a ceiling? There has not been in the past and as a result, parents have pumped into their schools huge sums of money that have made the schools centres of excellence..."⁴⁷ The school aimed to use funding to retain its extensive and experienced teaching staff, to keep class sizes small, and to maintain a favorable student-teacher ratio. Additionally, the governing body understood that financial investment in schooling led to increased parent and student investment in terms of time and energy. Not only did school fees mean students would gain access to more resources, but they would also become more likely to take advantage of this access. Student decisions about how to use resources reflected their use of schooling, academic and non-academic, to develop their interests. The high tuition permitted TSHS's focus on student growth and cultivated opportunities for self-understanding and expression, transforming student identity formation.

High tuition fees created a concentration of students from influential families, particularly politicians. Zulfa Abdurahman, who graduated in 1997, was the granddaughter of Abdullah Abdurahman, the first coloured city councilor and leader of the anti-segregationist movement African Political Organization. With so many of their family members intimately involved in South African politics, students often felt inclined to wrestle with the ever-shifting South African political landscape. In 1994, a group of students led by anti-apartheid activist Allan Boesak's daughter Pulane had the school sit on the soccer field in the formation of a peace sign "to show support for peace in South Africa over that tumultuous time."⁴⁸ At the same time, when Pulane Boesak was in the same class as a coloured student whose family was notoriously pro-Nationalist Party, the two students played pranks on each other to win over the rest of the class.⁴⁹

Such divisions among coloured students centered debates about 'colouredness.' Coloured alumna Lynn Abrahamse recounted the significance of the cheerleading songs at interschool athletic events. Over

⁴⁷ Trevor Webster, letter to South Africa Department of Education, November 1997, TSHS archives. See also Republic of South Africa, Department of Education, Government Notice no. 1313, October 3, 1997.

⁴⁸ Ronsel Fransman (former student), interview by author, January 18, 2016, Cape Town.

⁴⁹ Alard, interview.

her time at the school, songs incorporated Cape Afrikaans slang. By the time Abrahamse matriculated, the songs contained so much slang that administrators asked the cheerleading team to tone it down, and debates between coloured students ensued. To Abrahamse, the songs began to sound like they should have been performed by a “poor school in the Cape Flats, and we [were] not a poor school.”⁵⁰ Negotiations between coloured students and white administrators along linguistic and class lines revealed how students articulated difference within Cape Town’s coloured population. The expression of such divisions highlights the multifaceted nature of ‘colouredness’ and the limits of race in self-identification, challenging the apartheid hierarchy in which defined political and economic power through race.

Likewise, religious diversity at TSHS transformed and strengthened notions of colouredness. TSHS’s celebration of religious differences complicated white as well as coloured understandings of racial categories. White student Abrahamse recalled how Webster encouraged students to explain to others at school-wide assemblies what holidays such as Diwali, Hanukkah, Ramadan, and others meant to them.⁵¹ This recognition of religious diversity constituted an explicit, if informal, response to the demographic shifts that accompanied integration. TSHS’s celebration of religion allowed Abrahamse and others not only to identify but also understand their peers through more ways than race. Increased awareness about peers’ religious affiliations bolstered many students’ recognition of the complex, de-essentialized nature of racial identity. Fernandez described how his conception of colouredness expanded by learning about Ramadan from his Muslim friend in math class. TSHS allowed Muslim students to miss school on religious holidays, so when Fernandez noticed the absences, he asked his friend to introduce him to Islam.⁵² Through this encounter, Fernandez began to identify the coloured Muslim students primarily by their religion as opposed to their race, revealing his perception of the plurality of coloured identity.

Jeppie’s work on Muslim identity in Cape Town historicizes fractures in colouredness. His discussion of Izak David Du Plessis provides an

⁵⁰ Lynn Abrahamse (former student), interview by author, January 13, 2016, Cape Town.

⁵¹ Ian Abrahamse (former student), interview by author, January 13, 2016, Cape Town.

⁵² Fernandez, interview.

example from the early twentieth century of a theorist's articulation of certain coloureds' allegiance to the white government, which emphasized linguistic similarities between whites and Cape Muslims.⁵³ In contrast to Alard's emphasis on the subaltern origins of Afrikaans, Du Plessis claimed Afrikaans for Cape Muslims as a 'white' language. Du Plessis's work specified a Cape Malay ethnic identity constructed against a coloured Christian one. Cape Malay, he asserted, shared a common language and civilization with white Afrikaners.⁵⁴ Considering the racial separatism that underscored both black political and Islamic youth organizations' opposition to Du Plessis in the 1930s, this early period of innovation and contestation was a precursor to post-apartheid race-making. Cape Town in the 1990s again witnessed the production of claims to a separate, unique Malay identity. People Against Drugs and Gangsterism also surfaced in the Cape Flats in the wake of apartheid and exemplifies the longstanding policing of morality and religion within coloured communities.⁵⁵ The history of debating and organizing around difference within Cape Town's coloured communities reveals that TSHS did not itself destabilize coloured identity. Rather, the school encouraged visibility of and multiplicity within coloured identity. The transition to post-apartheid society did not transform a racial hierarchy, devoid of choice in terms of racial identification, to a racial rainbow, at the end of which existed a pot of newfound options. The history of coloured identity during and after apartheid reveals how historical circumstances and individual decisions coalesced to construct and reconstruct configurations of 'colouredness.'

IV. SCHOOLING AND SOCIOCULTURAL IDENTITY

At secondary schools, an individual student's identity is not determined solely by their race, class, language, religion, or heritage. Other modes of self-definition—not only in terms of academic strength and athletic success, but also with respect to their dress or taste in music, for example—are arguably more salient in young people's everyday lives. For white and coloured students at TSHS during the 1990s, integration offered

⁵³ Jeppie, "Re-classifications."

⁵⁴ See Izak David Du Plessis, *Die Bydrae van die Kaapse Maleier tot die Afrikaanse volkslied* (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers., 1935).

⁵⁵ Jeppie, "Re-classifications," 82.

new social and cultural avenues to identity formation. This section demonstrates how non-demographic, sociocultural categories of self-fashioning interacted with school policies and programs to render apparent to students the variegated identifications that in this context comprised the matrix of selfhood.

Taking into account that an overwhelming number of alumni emphasized the school's inculcation of camaraderie and work ethic, two related discourses frame this discussion: uniformity and individuality, and discipline and autonomy. By resolving conflicts and misunderstandings on a case-by-case basis, TSHS reconciled a culture of uniformity and discipline with student demands for pluralism and autonomy. This balancing act forced the school and students to be flexible and creative. The school's historical 'whiteness' provided a sociocultural backdrop to which coloured youth responded differently and in turn influenced.⁵⁶ Coloured youth played with and subverted racially inflected norms and categories of identity to configure new ways of being coloured, fitting in, and standing out. Rather than jeopardize colouredness, the diverse selves fostered by the freedom to draw on sociocultural categories bolstered the utility of colouredness as a cohesive identity, or *habitus*, to claim and convey.

Most widely, TSHS staff and students embraced identities centered on school pride. Nearly every alumna interviewed, regardless of racial affiliation, expressed adoration for the TSHS community. A new phenomenon for most coloured students and families after apartheid, pride in one's school reflected more than assimilationist excitement about attending a white school. To attend TSHS meant to participate in an alternate regime of socialization that worked to offer new possibilities to those able to gain entrance. Haupt explained the appeal of this regime to the coloured demographic at TSHS in the early 1990s: "It wasn't a definite we were going to university. Our parents worked hard to put us through school because we were not going to get a free ride."⁵⁷ Loyalty to TSHS presupposed advancement and had the potential to supersede or supplement coloured students' pride in their racial identity. School pride deconstructed and complicated the apartheid's fabrication of

⁵⁶ Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*.

⁵⁷ Kurt Haupt, interview.

colouredness. Unity between students forged a collective identity defined by attending TSHS, nullified the social significance of pre-existing hierarchies, and facilitated the elision of marginality coloured youth might have experienced. Fransman said TSHS “showed me you don’t have to be a racial stereotype because of the area you live in or the school you go to or how much money your parents have. Success depends on the choices you make.”⁵⁸ Coloured students indeed disrupted long-standing stereotypes, challenging race’s monopoly over the identity matrix.⁵⁹

The investment students showed in school culture demonstrated that TSHS’s reliance on uniformity and discipline worked in tandem to appeal to incoming coloured students. Du Plooy said “There was so much to do. I got involved in millions of things. I loved the academic, cultural, and the sports side. I tried to milk it and do as much as I could. I was busy all the time.”⁶⁰ Smidt-Booys expressed how the school emboldened students to take ownership over their education at TSHS: “You had to earn your place here. You got in, now you work. We got a lot of homework. There was lots of pressure. We had to belong to a society and do sports. We didn’t have time to play outside with friends.”⁶¹ Du Plooy and Smidt-Booys suggest a uniformity of involvement at TSHS that pushed students to partake in academic and non-academic endeavors. The language they use illuminates their drive to counteract notions of coloured youth as lazy or incompetent. Du Plooy and Smidt-Booys applied conformity, equity, and discipline to their student identities, establishing the foundations of school culture upon which students and administration negotiated to satisfy their particular interests. TSHS’s extracurricular opportunities complemented policies inside the classroom; by assigning significant homework and promoting extracurricular participation, TSHS attempted to limit the time students devoted to other out-of-school activities (not only time with friends but also substance abuse or crime). Since many informants saw TSHS students as not “naughty like the students at predominantly coloured schools,” schools which Smidt-Booys likened to

⁵⁸ Fransman, interview.

⁵⁹ The stereotypes of colouredness addressed here originated from the perception of coloureds as impure products of miscegenation or bastardization and include laziness, illegitimacy, physical and moral weakness, untrustworthiness, substance abuse, and gangsterism. See Zimitri Erasmus, introduction to *Coloured by History, Shaped by Place*, 17.

⁶⁰ Bronwynne Du Plooy, interview by author, January 12, 2016, Cape Town.

⁶¹ Smidt-Booys, interview.

a “maternity ward,” it can be said that students viewed their experience at TSHS as a chance to elide stereotypes of coloureds as unmotivated or troublesome.⁶² However, students accomplished this only by disciplining themselves to the school’s regime of control. In this way, the challenges coloured students made to stereotypes regarding colouredness in the first decade of integration did little to destabilize assumptions had about blackness.

TSHS being set apart from predominantly coloured schools by its ethos and extracurriculars had implications on the diversification of coloured identity. Coloured alumna Apollis explained that her husband “doesn’t understand the concept of school pride because he was at a coloured school, where the only thing he did was get up, go to school, and go home.” Apollis, by contrast, became Rotary Society co-president and represented TSHS at a city-wide conference. Although teachers usually attended this conference, the faculty advisor of Rotary Society held Apollis and her co-president accountable for attending the event. Differences in Apollis’s and her husband’s schooling demonstrate that increased educational opportunities prompted transformations in coloured youth identities. Whereas Apollis’s husband’s school gave students less exposure to extracurriculars and fewer chances at self-fashioning, TSHS provided the capacity to use extracurriculars and passions to supersede racial consciousness and emancipate themselves, to whatever limited degree, from their racial identities. As TSHS was “about finding a special niche,” students engaged in projects of continual self-creation.⁶³ Smidt-Booys explained how she became an accountant because of Ms. Hines’s class, and Alard said he became a conservationist from joining Exploration Society. Their attribution of professional identities to school experiences reveals how deeply resources afforded by TSHS shaped student identities.

The responsibilities coloured students assumed at school gave them an unprecedented, yet still limited, level of choice and authority, which they used to invalidate apartheid’s racial hierarchies. Coloured students framed their view of TSHS by reiterating that they attended neither a coloured school nor a white school. These students were conscious that

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Botha, interview.

TSHS was a privileged integrated space in which they could either emphasize or de-emphasize race. They knew colouredness existed, but in a space unprotected by TSHS's alternative regime of conversion in which race itself was not nullified but set aside for reexamination and redeployment. Integrated schooling strengthened colouredness through its variegation of the category, or more precisely through students' varying prioritization of racial identification. While many students who attended desegregated schools like TSHS understood themselves as coloured, school pride could and did transcend pride in racial identity. For eleventh grade, Hansby-Consul transferred to TSHS, and in two years she experienced a profound sense of belonging to a community, which she didn't find at a predominantly coloured school.⁶⁴ The freedom for individuals to position themselves in relation to school pride as well as racial background facilitated a self-guided reshuffling of the identity matrix.⁶⁵

TSHS's balance between individual attention and community building engendered further ingenuity in student identity formation. Smidt-Booys summed up students' reconciliation of these contrasting values: "If one of us excelled, it was good for all of us."⁶⁶ Students involved in organizations traveled to conferences and competitions, and, in response, TSHS rewarded investment on an individual and communal scale. Every year Du Plooy won the award for best athlete in her grade for her achievements in track and field hockey. The school announced these awards in an annual report, which they later published and mailed to students' families. Smidt-Booys explained, "If you achieved at anything you were praised. There was lots of praise so you wanted to get an award."⁶⁷ Not only did the administration award particular students, but TSHS also unified students by encouraging collaborative group work. Abrahamse discussed how interschool competitions elicited high turnout and strengthened loyalty to TSHS. Apollis recounted the pride she felt during a fundraiser when everyone in her class participated.⁶⁸ Even if administrative policies and programs instigated collective identity,

⁶⁴ Elwyn Hansby-Consul (former student), interview by author, January 15, 2016, Cape Town.

⁶⁵ Jo-Ann Meyer Apollis (former student), interview by author, January 14, 2016, Cape Town.

⁶⁶ Smidt-Booys, interview.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Apollis, interview.

students proactively demonstrated solidarity with their peers. When one student broke a classroom window, the whole class banded together to claim responsibility so that the individual would not have to take the blame.⁶⁹ Incidents like these demonstrated the moral aspect of students’ loyalty to TSHS and underlined the inventiveness of students who aligned the school’s ethos with their own interests and identities. Adherence to a tacit moral code subverted perceptions of coloured students as naughty, immoral, or untrustworthy.

The collective identity forged at TSHS often collided with students’ desire for cultural expression, resulting in configurations of identity that positively foregrounded race. The school’s insistence upon uniforms made this clash most apparent. A controversy brewed the year Botha matriculated: “Matric jackets had to be a certain type. But in coloured culture it was about bomber jackets. Initially, administrators said no to bomber jackets, so we had to buy the other jackets. But eventually the school said we could wear coloured jackets, only on school grounds.”⁷⁰ Botha’s story reflected the endurance of racial consciousness among an integrated community, as students continued to fashion themselves according to their background. Her anecdote also made clear that students drove administrative changes, so that school policies transformed to keep up with the shifting demographics. Students adjusted to TSHS rules and culture, just as TSHS made its own modifications on the basis of racial difference. Policy changes grounded in racial and cultural differences legitimated coloured students’ claim to their educational space. Although TSHS aspired to present itself in a unified way, students attained the freedom to express specific racial, ethnic, or cultural identities in their learning environment.

Like the administration, white students responded to coloured articulations of style and sensibility. Cooperation between students and administration led to new attitudes about hairstyle. Botha recounted TSHS’s relaxation of rules about straight hair: “Originally girls weren’t allowed to have curls or a perm. One teacher complained about coloured girls having curly hair, but she didn’t understand that some coloured hair just did this even if they didn’t have a perm. Then the white kids started

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Botha, interview.

to do a perm. They had a valid point: if it looks same, what does it matter if it's natural or unnatural. So the school listened."⁷¹ The presence of coloured students not only opened up the school's collective identity to contestation, but also created new possibilities of identities for white students. Yet there were further effects of changing regulations. Rules about girls' hairstyles revealed the gendered policies of TSHS, as there were unequal restrictions on female self-expression. However, when the Rastafari student earned the right to wear her hair in dreads, the school reformulated its dress code to allow for more variance in hairstyle. Such negotiations demonstrated how acceptance of racial and cultural difference fostered more gender equity at TSHS, which benefited white, coloured, and African female students.

Hairstyles were only one of many ways students tested out modes of self-fashioning. Throughout the mid-1990s, "white kids started walking like coloured kids and talking and dressing up like them."⁷² The rising number of coloured students led to more conversations that centered colouredness among the mainly white administration and between students. While coloured identity differentiation occurred during apartheid, its move into a historically white school destabilized conceptions of race and modified the *habitus* among white students and faculty. Coloured student Lynn Abrahamse and white student Ian Abrahamse, now married and TSHS teachers, explained how the music at the Valentine's Day dance illustrated this school-wide process of identity transformation: "Were we going to play white music like rock or alternative or coloured music, which was R&B and hip hop? At the time everyone was adapting to different backgrounds. It was a period when certain groups of people enjoyed certain types of music. It was more rigid. Now it's more mixed."⁷³ With integration, the matrix of identifications expanded to account for increased exposure to different music and culture. Subsequently, students—and TSHS—gained access to multifaceted modes of self-definition. The school's regulations changed to accommodate new ways of being, as students of various backgrounds challenged previously monolithic ideas about what was 'white,' what was 'coloured,' and, increasingly, what was 'black.' Botha related, "The

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Botha, interview.

⁷³ Lynn Abrahamse, interview.

background of coloured kids was scattered, and white students latched onto this concept.”⁷⁴ White students grasped not only the multiplicity of colouredness, but in doing so, also the complexities of whiteness. Botha’s language conveyed again the utility of colouredness and whiteness as discrete categories at the same time they were de-essentialized.

While students compromised, collaborated, and learned across racial lines, racial pride manifested itself inside and outside classrooms and reaffirmed coloured legibility. In one class where the teacher did not assign seats, “coloured students sat on one side and white on the other.”⁷⁵ Williams echoed this sentiment and applied it to athletics: “If there was a game of or rugby we would tend to group together because of race. The males would get together and try to prove that our race is better than your race, as far as sport is concerned. We had to prove ourselves, which is kind of the dynamic that happened in national sporting events.”⁷⁶ Dolby corroborates Williams’s hypothesis about national trends by demonstrating that rugby prowess often served to brand a school as ‘white’ and helped maintain the selective admission of whites and non-whites of higher class.⁷⁷ Despite this tendency, Rubin argues that rugby “contains an inherent dimension of unpredictability that allows it to recombine and challenge the symbols and sentiments assigned to it.”⁷⁸ Considering rugby’s encouragement of performance and creativity, coloured students like Williams used rugby to lay bare the school’s ‘whiteness’ by consciously playing in a “coloured style.”⁷⁹ Through their racialism, coloured students challenged TSHS’s use of rugby in perpetuating white supremacy. Since coloured and white students worked together in the name of TSHS at interschool competitions, ‘colouredness’ increasingly inflected the school’s collective external identity.

⁷⁴ Botha, interview.

⁷⁵ Apollis, interview.

⁷⁶ Williams, interview.

⁷⁷ Nadine E. Dolby, *Constructing Race: Youth, Identity, and Popular Culture in South Africa* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).

⁷⁸ Joshua Rubin, “Making Art from Uncertainty: Magic and Its Politics in South African Rugby,” *Cultural Anthropology* 29, no. 4 (November 2014): 715.

⁷⁹ Williams, interview.

TSHS's negotiations with coloured students relaxed its emphasis on discipline as a means to conserve 'whiteness.' Although the school initially did not offer soccer (the most popular sport among coloureds) to promote rugby and cricket, by the late 1990s coloured students successfully campaigned to have soccer included in the athletics program. Alard contributed to this effort, but Williams expressed appreciation for the school's insistence on rugby and cricket because it taught students the value of adhering to regulations. Coloured students' different reactions to TSHS's athletic options mirror tensions between rule-following and rule-breaking coloured youth, illuminating contestations over what it meant to be coloured during integration. The school's reaction to substance abuse similarly highlighted key compromises in TSHS's treatment of transgression: "Lynn was a prefect and was caught smoking, but Webster didn't hold it over her head. He liked her even more and afterwards their relationship was stronger. Lynn lost her prefect status, but now she's a teacher at TSHS."⁸⁰ Webster's relationship with Abrahamse demonstrated how the school reconciled its self-definition as a regime of socialization with its role as a channel of individual growth. Webster's leniency reflected TSHS's recognition that coloured students, like youth in general, were more multifaceted than the stereotype of either disciplined or disobedient. Integration bred familiarity with students of all backgrounds, allowing for nuance in expressions of self and difference.

As the administration eased its reliance upon discipline, TSHS framed their encouragement of individual attainment in terms of developing students' autonomous expression. Apollis said, "I'm very expressive, and I talk with my hands. At school the teachers used to say, 'Don't shy away from the way you speak.' If I had gone to a coloured school, I would have probably not been as expressive and assertive as I was."⁸¹ In a school where race did not determine one's position, students developed attributes that allowed them to be successful *and* themselves. Pheiffer, a parent, endorsed the school's activation of critical thinking and dialogue: "Learners are never 'talked down' to and not simply spoon fed with facts. My children have related to us the stimulating debates and interaction they have participated in during the learning process."⁸² Pheiffer noted

⁸⁰ Apollis, interview.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² B.O. Pheiffer, letter to Trevor Webster, TSHS archives.

that student involvement extended to the management of the school, as the governing body included students in legislative meetings. Consequently, students felt they could use their ideas to shape the direction of the school's growth. Fransman remembered that students “spoke freely about our differences and about how people of color were disadvantaged in the past. In retrospect perhaps the coloured people spoke more freely.”⁸³ Coloured students, now liberated from the logic of race they internalized at predominantly coloured schools, embraced their racial background in a school where race was not the primary factor in their education. They used the tools and confidence they gained from the school to transform it.

TSHS reconciled individual advancement with group affinity, and discipline to autonomy of expression and freedom of being. The school had its own matrix of values that collided with the matrix of identifications and outlined the circumstances within which students understood and expressed subjectivities. The intersection of these matrices at TSHS in the 1990s proved constructive because each matrix illuminated the full breaches and breadth of the other. Collisions between student identity and school culture illustrated how TSHS—its students and staff—challenged the monopoly of race, evoking the post-apartheid paradox whereby race became pronounced as a factor in identity-shaping yet limited in scope. Critically, TSHS had the resources to make these negotiations without losing emphasis on social mobility. TSHS continued to prioritize prestige and mobility but of a different kind—that not attached to whiteness but to blackness. In the early 2000s more teachers became coloured, and school fees remained lofty. There were more fee exemptions and scholarships, however, due in large part to generous funding from alumni—whose pride in TSHS has transcended their time as students.

V. STUDENT HERITAGE COMMEMORATION AND THE TURN TOWARD BLACKNESS

During apartheid, most coloureds did not explore, nor identify with, their African ancestry. As slavery and Khoisan heritage were “generally treated

⁸³ Fransman, interview.

as embarrassments requiring a tactful silence rather than as affirmations of group identity,” celebrations of non-European lineage occurred rarely.⁸⁴ Instead, coloureds focused on the ‘whiteness’ of their ancestry.⁸⁵ By contrast, heritage commemoration at TSHS during the early 2000s reflected and propelled students’ identification with black history and culture. This section explains how heritage ceremonies surfaced in conjunction with transformations at TSHS and within a broader context of commemoration in South Africa. The burgeoning affinity with black culture apparent in these practices shows how youth and schooling functioned dialogically in post-apartheid race-making and identity-shaping.

As the percentage of coloureds at TSHS increased, classes changed to take into account their backgrounds and interests. Alard’s senior South African history project exemplified how students drove curricular developments. Alard, compelled by his experiences with Afrikaans debate, hoped to research apartheid legislation in order to understand its effectiveness. Although his teacher excluded apartheid from the list of permissible topics, the teacher conceded to Alard’s proposal because he was struck by Alard’s passion.⁸⁶ That year (perhaps in response to Alard’s project), history teachers Mr. Solomon and Ms. Knight expanded and transformed the history they taught, and encouraged students to question the history they learned.⁸⁷ History classes examined the influence of Steve Biko, founder of the Black Consciousness Movement. As students debated the roles of Biko and other activists in apartheid’s dismantling, they gained the intellectual tools to position their own viewpoints in response to well-known activists who appealed to blackness to undermine white supremacy. Apollis said debates “provoked us to think about why apartheid persecuted blacks and how that system could still be challenged.” Since coloured students increasingly “called out teachers and other students on their rules and racism,” their challenges to the curriculum and school norms reflected growing consciousness and embrace of blackness.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Adhikari, *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough*, 16.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Alard, interview.

⁸⁷ Webster, interview.

⁸⁸ Apollis, interview. Similar sentiments were also expressed by Fransman.

The opportunity for students to explore their heritage prefigured both classroom debates about the BCM and ANC and TSHS's commemoration ceremonies. Throughout the 1990s, TSHS's integration program required students to complete family trees and present them to classmates. The administration hoped the trees would give students the capacity to see themselves as individuals regardless of race.⁸⁹ Yet, the perspectives of students reveal how the family trees became an avenue of race-making that laid groundwork for many coloured youth's solidarity with blackness. Although Abrahamse's family claimed it was “very important [she] must know [her] mom's side had Dutch and German blood,” the opportunity to learn more about her indigenous side piqued her curiosities. Since apartheid had ended, Abrahamse questioned the value her family attached to white ancestry.⁹⁰ TSHS's family tree project thus bred intergenerational divides in terms of how coloured people positioned themselves along the axis of race. Divides were not only intergenerational, but also intra-generational. Botha's comment that “It would be better if coloureds just considered themselves blacks,” represents a different alignment with blackness than Abrahamse's interest in her indigenous background. Even those who embraced similarities with whites revealed how options expanded through awareness of family histories. Du Plooy explained, “It was interesting to know, I'm not that different from you. There may have been different choices my family made along the way, but we all come from the same places.”⁹¹ Du Plooy's reference to ‘different choices’ implied that coloured identity had long been a function of coloured decisions (not simply apartheid racialization) —and that she was *aware* that colouredness resulted from individual choices.

Students who shared and listened to family histories in an integrated environment had to think about how their backgrounds influenced their racial identity, and how race operated within the matrix of self-identifications. They left behind the ‘logic of race’ through which the apartheid government manufactured a false matrix of selfhood, one that concealed not only axes of identifications but also untapped individual

⁸⁹ Van de Berg (former teacher), interview by author, January 12, 2016, Cape Town.

⁹⁰ Lynn Abrahamse, interview.

⁹¹ Du Plooy, interview.

potential. Students' newfound embrace of blackness changed how they understood themselves and their politics. Considering coloured organizations and individuals throughout apartheid expressed identifications with blackness (e.g., La Guma), family tree projects exposed and expanded long invisible efforts to reconfigure colouredness to support black liberation. The option for students to align themselves with their white and/or black lineage illuminated one way in which identity differentiation in post-apartheid South Africa was and remains a uniquely coloured story.

Simultaneously, learning about coloured backgrounds supplemented white students' knowledge of their multifaceted heritage. As Cornel West reminds us, 'whiteness' is a politically constructed category parasitic on 'blackness.'⁹² Coloured students' interrogation of the relationship between colouredness and blackness necessarily prompted white students to question the historical and contemporary relationships of whites to other races and ethnicities. Abrahamse and Fernandez expressed that while white students initially felt superior to coloured students, family trees equalized whites and coloureds and showed them that whites were not intrinsically superior.⁹³ Since fewer white students attended TSHS over time, however, awareness of and identification with blackness became an increasing priority at the school. Student investment in heritage drove TSHS to address and redress the blackness of a past it had largely ignored.

In 1810, Khoisan woman Saartjie Baartman was taken from the Eastern Cape to London. Known for her body features, especially her breasts and buttocks, Baartman was exhibited at the Piccadilly Circus and given the nickname "Hottentot Venus."⁹⁴ When Baartman's appearance in the exhibition provoked outcry on behalf of the African Association, her captor and showman Cezar defended the exhibition: "Has she not as good a right to exhibit herself as an Irish Giant or a Dwarf?"⁹⁵ The African Association took the matter to court, but the English Court of King's Bench dismissed the case after what historians suspect were dubious

⁹² Cornel West, *Race Matters* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

⁹³ Ian Abrahamse, interview; Fernandez, interview.

⁹⁴ "Hottentot" is a derogatory term used commonly in the eighteenth and nineteenth century to refer to Khoikhoi.

⁹⁵ Sadiya Qureshi, "Displaying Sara Baartman, the 'Hottentot Venus,'" *History of Science* 42, no. 2 (June 2004): 233.

testimonies.⁹⁶ When the publicity from the case increased her exhibition’s popularity, Cezar took Baartman on tour around Great Britain and eventually sold her to a French showman.

Today, Baartman remains a prevalent symbol of imperial racism and sexism. When Baartman’s body was returned to Cape Town in 2002, the committee in charge of her enrobement ceremony asked TSHS students to serve as guardsmen and honor Baartman’s life. Students’ experiences at Baartman’s enrobement, such as learning her story of displacement and exploitation, compelled them to raise awareness of indigenous heritage. Matriculating students donated a ceramic mural portraying a herder encampment at the Western Cape in the late 1600s. That September, the school held a ceremony in which they installed the mural in a courtyard renamed the Cochoqua Court, honoring the Khoikhoi as the first inhabitants of the region. During the ceremony, students and families read a pamphlet compiled by TSHS. One page included a message from Webster, who wrote that the ceremony’s significance lay in acknowledging the Khoikhoi as the original inhabitants of the land so that students of Khoikhoi descent could feel pride in their heritage and stake a claim in their school environment.⁹⁷ The transfer of gifts from Khoisan chief Mathys-Coetzee to Webster signified the school’s assumption of a black African identity. It also underscored TSHS’s paradoxical embrace of indigeneity and settlement.



Figure 2. The Freedom Bell at TSHS. The inscription on the bottom left reads: “This Freedom Bell commemorates the stand of our school against prejudice of all kinds, especially racism and sexism. Symbolically this bell rings in our freedom from prejudice” (Photo by author).

⁹⁶ See Pamela Scully and Clifton Crais, “Race and Erasure: Sara Baartman and Hendrik Cezars in Cape Town and London.” *Journal of British Studies* 47, no. 2 (April 2008): 301-23.

⁹⁷ “The Naming of the Cochoqua Court and the Unveiling of the Mural,” TSHS archives.

Revisionist narratives, adopted by TSHS administration in ceremonies and school books, connected indigeneity with trailblazing and obscured the specific histories of coloured creativity and identification with blackness. Cultural heritage scholar Sabine Marschall reminds us that “The diversity and ambiguity that is invariably associated with any vernacular cultural expression must necessarily be simplified and synchronized.”⁹⁸ However, what the courtyard and memorials achieved was the visibility of longstanding connections between colouredness and blackness. The 2004 Freedom Bell ceremony revealed how whites at TSHS began to examine not just coloured history but particular aspects of coloured history that aligned it with global black diasporic symbolisms and ideologies. The design of the bell was the brainchild of white teacher Mr. Jonker; its ideation the product of a multiracial/multiethnic committee of administrators, parents, and students. The bell references the slave bell used in the Cape Colony, yet transforms its configuration to signify progress in South Africa and TSHS along the lines of racial and gender non-discrimination. Dedicated by former Robben Island political prisoner Ahmed Kathrada on Women’s Day, the bell revealed TSHS’s acknowledgement of the intersectionality of race- and gender-based oppression in the history and aftermath of enslavement.

Considering the school’s perspective on heritage commemoration, how groundbreaking was this turn toward blackness? Adhikari writes that efforts to explore coloured identity since the mid-1990s worked to invigorate pride in Khoisan and slave pasts.⁹⁹ Although South African political culture trended toward honoring black histories, TSHS encouraged associations between blackness and mobility in a way that distinguished it from other ‘prestigious’ Cape Town schools.¹⁰⁰ Students like the young Rastafari woman prompted such associations, but administrators’ encouragement of these associations solidified the deep,

⁹⁸ Sabine Marschall, “Commemorating the ‘Trojan Horse’ Massacre in Cape Town: The Tension between Vernacular and Official Expressions of Memory,” *Visual Studies* 25, no. 2 (September 2010): 135.

⁹⁹ Adhikari, *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough*, 7.

¹⁰⁰ Many scholars have shown how, despite the transition to an ANC-led government, prestige in schooling remained tied to ‘whiteness’ into the 2000s. See, in particular, Dolby, *Constructing Race*; Mark Hunter, “Racial Desegregation and Schooling in South Africa: Contested Geographies of Class Formation,” *Environment and Planning* 42, no. 11 (November 2010): 2640-57; Soudien, *Realising the Dream*.

widespread nature of the transformation in school culture. Webster's actions demonstrated a commitment to marginalized histories. De Louw explained, “We were constantly reminded during assembly about our heritage with Webster who wore the attire given to him from one of the chiefsman/tribe members of a Khoisan group. At one stage he wanted to adjust the school song to acknowledge their settlement in the Cape and on the land before our school was built.”¹⁰¹ Webster's proposals made evident that by the early 2000s the administration instigated its own negotiations informed and inspired by subaltern heritage.

The school implemented its commitment to a ‘black’ identity not only through but beyond symbolic representation. In addition to hiring more coloured faculty, TSHS sustained internal representations of black heritage and disrupted and dissolved conventional race-class dynamics. Unlike the school song, for example, Webster's reminders to students about the school's connection to black histories were not broadcast to the outside world. Similarly, a TSHS musical in 1998 reflected on the forced removal of black and coloured residents from District Six.¹⁰² TSHS's move to explore students' religious diversity similarly entailed enhancing consciousness of subaltern history. Such efforts confirmed TSHS's association of consciousness of difference—the antithesis of ‘whiteness’—with progress and even socioeconomic mobility. The Freedom Bell continues to be rung during school ceremonies, particularly graduation, as a connecting node between students' move into the future and their remembrance of the past. Considering that transformations in school culture were external and internal, before and after commemoration ceremonies, TSHS's connection between individual development and black history and consciousness marked the turn as substantive.

Because heritage “is constructed in terms of its narrowing into more dominant ‘authorised’ versions,” coloured student and parent perspectives are necessary in illuminating subaltern constructions of heritage.¹⁰³ Willa Boesak, a noted coloured theologian, author, and TSHS

¹⁰¹ Danielle de Louw (former student), interview by author, January 12, 2016, Cape Town.

¹⁰² Smidt-Booys, interview.

¹⁰³ Gary Minkley and Phindezwa Mnyanka, “Seeing Beyond the Official and Vernacular: The Duncan Village Massacre Memorial and the Politics of Heritage in South Africa,” in *The Politics of Heritage in Africa: Economies, Histories, and Infrastructures*, ed. Derek Peterson, Kodzo Gavua, and Ciraj Rassool (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 56.

student-parent, wrote "One cannot face the future without knowledge of your past. During colonial times and apartheid years, the culture of the Khoisan had been demonized. Even today, a popular stereotype would be: 'Those people were so lazy and godless!' But is it true? No. On the contrary, they adhered to a vibrant lifestyle based upon spiritual and moral-ethical values."¹⁰⁴ He added that TSHS was not only one of the first schools to integrate but also the first to honor the indigenous community on whose land it stood. Boesak's message implied the importance of heritage awareness in undermining generalizations and facilitating future success; he reconciled and reiterated TSHS's emphasis on individual progress with a consciousness of the histories that gave shape to contemporary racial and ethnic identities. He alluded to President Thabo Mbeki's vision of an African Renaissance when describing the school's ceremonies. Coloured alumna Reeve-Joy Plaatjies said, "Being a part of the ceremony of the Cochoqua Court made me feel proud and privileged to be part of a school that recognises diverse history... Soon after finding out about my ancestors, I began to probe other cultures and from where they originated."¹⁰⁵ Embracing the Africanness of their heritage and exploring the origins of others, coloured students became 'The Settlers' of TSHS; they forged a path that altered the school's socialization of identities, including their own. In this process, TSHS became more 'coloured' and more 'black.'

VI. CONCLUSION: CONTINGENCY, CREATIVITY, AND COLOUREDNESS

Being coloured at TSHS in the wake of apartheid not only meant having choices, since those classified 'coloured' during apartheid made choices to constitute their self-definitions, but also being aware that there were options. Because the school did not define students by race, race became one of many flexible axes along which students defined themselves. Within the framework of values that gave shape to TSHS culture, students transformed pre-existing, racially inflected norms. Not only did coloured students play with conceptions of colouredness, but they also reconfigured TSHS's rules, values, and interest in black history.

¹⁰⁴ "The Naming of the Cochoqua Court and the Unveiling of the Mural," TSHS archives.

¹⁰⁵ Reeve-Joy Plaatjies, written response to Cochoqua Courtyard Ceremony, TSHS archives.

By constructing and reconstructing new identities for themselves and their school, coloured students at TSHS in the 1990s influenced ‘whiteness.’ White students and staff gained awareness of the role of agency and contingency in identity formation. Conscious of the dimensions of identity differentiation, white TSHS students during integration turned a tolerance of racial differences into long-term action. Abrahamse not only married a coloured woman (an increasingly common but notable decision, as Lynn is frequently asked if she is her children’s nanny), he also joined a rugby club where the vast majority of players are coloured: “The fact that I am comfortable and happy to play at a coloured rugby club has a lot to do with having come through TSHS, experiencing that transition—because that’s where I learned how to meet coloured people and black people and Asian people.”¹⁰⁶ Fernandez similarly expressed an understanding of differences within those who classified ‘coloured,’ explaining that his awareness of heterogeneity has led to an ability to work effectively with people of dissimilar backgrounds.

Therefore, the ‘we’ in Alard’s question, “What have we left behind?” references the ‘white’ experience as well. Integration at TSHS not only equalized access to education for a subset of whites and coloureds, but also made clear to coloured and white students that ‘whiteness’ was not intrinsically superior to ‘colouredness.’

In terms of lived experience, the transition to a post-apartheid ‘rainbow nation’ did not entail a fixed shift from a racial hierarchy that absorbed choice to a rainbow of opportunities for non-whites to destabilize norms and construct the self. The history of coloured identity during apartheid reveals how historical circumstances combined with individual decisions to locate and relocate various forms of ‘colouredness.’ Working through demographic and sociocultural differences, TSHS students and administrators clarified that race was a single non-hierarchical axis of identification, not an entire matrix of being unto itself.

TSHS accomplished this transformation largely *without* a politicized history curriculum. The inclusion of personal and national history in the curriculum facilitated awareness of contingency and agency in self-definition. But as TSHS proved, awareness of the role of race in defining the self was fostered by more than academics. This awareness was borne

¹⁰⁶ Ian Abrahamse, interview.

from the fact that the school was privileged in its resources, and relatedly, that TSHS's matrix of values interacted constructively with the matrix of possible identifications. Consciousness of contingency spawned from contingent circumstances.

Students' increased awareness of individual choice in self-definition was borne also from the fact that the incoming students had once been classified, and understood themselves, as coloured. Further studies would explore how dynamics of schooling and socialization at TSHS compared to schools to which black African youth integrated. On one hand, I have suggested that any integrated education leads to recognition of pluralism (with enduring solidarities based on background and history), and that schools occupy useful spaces for this process due to their encouragement of ingenuity. Yet, the underlying hybridity—and invariably, the discourse of hybridity—that accompanies coloured identity was conducive to the school's sidelining and safeguarding of racial and ethnic differences. Field clarifies that the "simultaneous location" of colouredness both "between and within these essentialist discourses [of 'whiteness' and 'blackness'] involves contradictory tensions, ambivalences, and struggle through a mixture of confusion and clarity."¹⁰⁷ Being 'coloured' gave coloured students profound flexibility not only in how to conceptualize and prioritize race within their self-definitions, but also in how to represent their racial identities. If colouredness denotes a fragile identity, it also constitutes a malleable point along the axis of race within the matrix of self-identifications. 'Whiteness' and 'Africanness' were also constructed and contestable during and after apartheid. Post-apartheid 'colouredness,' however, meant the ability to access both of these categories—and much more.

¹⁰⁷ Sean Field, "Fragile Identities: Memory, Emotion and Coloured Residents of Windermere," in *Coloured by History, Shaped by Place*, 104.

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